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  Cortical	  reactions	  to	  verbal	  abuse:	  event-­‐related	  brain	  potentials	  reflecting	  the	  
processing	  of	  socially	  threatening	  words	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words	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  anxiety	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  Neuner1;	  submitted	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  carried	  out	  all	  clinical	  interviews	  and	  a	  large	  number	  of	  EEG	  recordings.	  I	  performed	  the	  data	  pre-­‐
processing	  and	  supported	  the	  development	  of	  procedures	  and	  routines	  for	  EEG	  data	  analyses.	  I	  performed	  
the	  statistical	  analyses	  and	  drafted	  the	  manuscript.	  
	  
Article	  #3:	  Time	  course	  of	  emotional	  face	  processing	  in	  social	  anxiety	  disorder	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  clinical	  interviews	  and	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  large	  number	  of	  EEG	  recordings.	  I	  contributed	  to	  data	  pre-­‐
processing	  and	  supported	  the	  development	  of	  procedures	  and	  routines	  for	  EEG	  data	  analyses.	  I	  performed	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2	   Introduction	  
2.1	  	   Introduction	  to	  the	  context	  of	  this	  research	  
Imagine	  yourself	  roaming	  through	  a	  forest.	  The	  beauty	  of	  nature	  and	  the	  smell	  of	  fresh	  grass	  and	  
wood	  fill	  your	  senses.	  Meanwhile,	  your	  thoughts	  are	  floating	  between	  the	  present	  and	  past	  events	  of	  
your	   life.	   Suddenly	   you	   hear	   a	   hissing	   sound.	   You	   turn	   around	   and	   catch	   sight	   of	   a	   snake	   nearby.	  
Immediately	   your	  musculature	   is	   activated.	   Your	   heart	   is	   pounding,	   your	   body	   is	   shaking	   and	   your	  
pupils	   are	   dilated.	   The	   thought,	   “Snakes	   are	   fast	   and	   dangerous	   animals”	   intrudes	   your	   mind.	   The	  
sound	   of	   the	   forest	   and	   the	   smell	   of	   grass	   suddenly	   disappear	   and	   the	   feelings	   of	   fear	   and	   anxiety	  
dominate	   the	  moment.	  Your	  entire	  attention	   is	  dedicated	   to	   the	  hissing	  snake,	   leaving	  you	   to	  decide	  
between	  fight	  or	  flight.	  	  
This	  cascade	  of	  bodily	  activations	  represents	  the	  function	  of	  a	  normal	  fear	  structure	  (Foa	  &	  Kozak,	  
1986;	  Lang,	  1979)	  that	  serves	  as	  an	  evolutionary	  written	  scheme	  for	  responding	  to	  impending	  danger	  
(LeDoux,	  2000;	  Öhman	  &	  Mineka,	  2001).	  Being	  confronted	  with	  threats	  like	  a	  dangerous	  animal	  or	  a	  
suddenly	  approaching	  car	  demands	  the	  fast	  recognition	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  meaning	  of	  
possible	   threats	   (Huppert	  &	  Foa,	  2004).	   Luckily	  our	  perception	   is	  not	  only	   sensitive	   to	   the	   stimulus	  
itself	  but	  also	   to	  pictorial	   representation	  of	   the	   feared	  stimulus.	  Hence,	  emotionally	  arousing	  stimuli	  
that	  are	  either	  highly	  aversive,	  such	  as	  pictures	  of	  spiders	  or	  guns,	  or	  highly	  attractive,	  such	  as	  erotic	  
pictures	  (Junghöfer,	  Bradley,	  Elbert	  &	  Lang,	  2001)	  attract	  our	  attention.	  The	  common	  denominator	  of	  
such	  arousing	  stimuli	  is	  that	  they	  indicate	  relevance	  for	  basic	  motivational	  goals,	  in	  particular	  survival	  
or	  reproduction.	  Within	  a	  two-­‐factorial	  model	  of	  emotions	  (Bradley	  &	  Lang,	  1994)	  these	  stimuli	  can	  be	  
arranged	  according	   to	   the	  dimensions	  of	  valence	  (pleasant	  vs.	  unpleasant)	  and	  arousal	   (arousing	  vs.	  
calm).	  The	  outlined	   rapid	  allocation	  of	   attention	   resources	   to	   such	   stimuli	   is	   typically	   referred	   to	  as	  
“bias”	   or	   “attention	   bias”.	   These	   biases	   are	   embedded	   within	   a	   neural	   pathway	   that	   encompasses	  
several	  brain	  structures	  located	  in	  various	  regions	  of	  the	  human	  brain	  (Lang	  &	  Bradley,	  2009;	  LeDoux,	  
2000).	   If	   a	   potential	   threat	   is	   detected,	   the	   activation	   of	   a	   fear	   network	   typically	   entails	   the	  
mobilization	   of	   all	   bodily	   systems	   leading	   to	   an	   affective	   (fear	   of	   the	   snake),	   cognitive	   (“it	  will	   bite	  
me”),	  motivational	   (survive!)	  and	  physical	   (pounding	  heart,	   sweating)	  reaction.	  While	  escaping	   from	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snakes	   might	   not	   be	   part	   of	   our	   daily	   routine,	   everyone	   can	   probably	   think	   of	   somewhat	   similar	  
situations:	  Even	   if	  not	   faced	  with	   imminent	  danger	  of	  death,	  we	  are	  used	   to	   the	   reactions	  described	  
above	  as	  part	  of	  the	  body’s	  natural	  response	  to	  stress.	  
While	  nature	  equipped	  us	  with	  an	  adaptive	  system	  that	  works	  very	  efficiently	  when	  faced	  with	  a	  
physical	   threat,	   this	   system	   sometimes	   works	   against	   us.	   Under	   certain	   conditions,	   people	   may	  
misjudge	  a	  situation´s	  importance	  to	  their	  physical	  or	  social	  wellbeing,	  leading	  to	  a	  fear	  response	  even	  
when	  this	  is	  not	  the	  appropriate	  reaction	  in	  the	  given	  situation.	  Evolutionarily	  speaking	  our	  body	  and	  
brain	   seem	   to	   prefer	   a	   “false	   positive”	   (false	   alarm)	   over	   a	   “false	   negative”	   (missed	   danger)	   when	  
confronted	  with	  an	  ambiguous	  situation	  (Beck,	  Emery,	  &	  Greenberg,	  2005).	  	  
Let	  us	  now	  turn	  from	  the	  (fortunately)	  rare	  occasion	  of	  being	  confronted	  with	  a	  snake	  or	  spider	  to	  
an	   everyday	   situation.	   Imagine	   yourself	   in	   front	   of	   an	   audience	   just	   before	   giving	   a	   speech	   or	   in	   a	  
group	   facing	   the	   task	   of	   introducing	   yourself.	  What	   precisely	  would	   be	   the	   focus	   of	   your	   attention?	  
Which	   aspects	   of	   the	   environment	   would	   be	   crucial	   for	   the	  way	   you	   feel	   and	   behave?	  Would	   your	  
physical	   reactions	  resemble	   the	  situation	   in	   the	   forest	  when	  being	  confronted	  with	   the	  snake?	  What	  
will	  be	  crucial	  for	  the	  way	  you	  feel	  and	  interact	  in	  a	  situation	  such	  as	  this	  one?	  What	  are	  aspects	  and	  
occasions	   you	   might	   fear?	   Being	   accompanied	   and	   appreciated	   by	   others	   is	   a	   basic	   human	   need	  
(Baumeister	   &	   Leary,	   1995)	   and	   part	   of	   our	   everyday	   social	   life.	   If	   you	   were	   suffering	   from	   social	  
anxiety,	   your	  main	   concern	  might	  be	  a	  negative	  evaluation	  by	  others.	  Consequently,	   you	  would	   fear	  
that	   your	   behavior	   will	   result	   in	   other	   people	   thinking	   you	   were	   weak,	   stupid	   or	   somehow	   less	  
approachable.	   Ultimately,	   this	   might	   result	   in	   social	   exclusion	   and	   social	   isolation.	   The	   emerging	  
“social	   pain”	  would	   lead	   to	   similar	   psychological	   and	   physiological	   reactions	   tendencies	   as	   physical	  
pain	  (e.g.	  being	  bitten	  by	  a	  snake;	  Corr,	  2005;	  MacDonald	  &	  Leary,	  2010,	  2005).	  One	  way	  of	  monitoring	  
any	  indication	  of	  such	  a	  potential	  outcome	  could	  be	  the	  quick	  detection	  of	  possibly	  threatening	  cues	  in	  
oneself	   or	   others,	   respectively.	   These	   cues	   could	   represent	   a	   threat	   for	   your	   social	   integrity	   (social	  
rank	  or	  group	  affiliation).	  Thus,	   to	  catch	  a	  glimpse	  of	  a	   facial	  expression	  or	  another	  cue	   indicating	  a	  
negative	   evaluation	  might	   result	   in	   an	   immediate	   fear	   response	   that	  will	   capture	   your	   attention	   as	  
quickly	  and	  efficiently	  as	  being	  confronted	  with	  a	  physical	  threat.	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Aside	   from	   rather	   normal	   fear	   reactions,	   much	   research	   has	   been	   dedicated	   to	   fear-­‐related	  
attention	  processes	  in	  the	  pathological	  form	  of	  social	  anxiety,	  namely	  social	  anxiety	  disorder	  (or	  social	  
phobia,	  in	  the	  following	  the	  abbreviation	  SAD	  will	  be	  used).	  During	  the	  past	  three	  decades	  studies	  have	  
reported	  evidence	   for	  deviant	   internal	  and	  external	  attention	   foci	   in	  SAD	  (e.g.	  Heinrichs	  &	  Hofmann,	  
2001;	   Schultz	   &	  Heimberg,	   2008).	  While	   prominent	  models	   highlight	   a	   biased	   internal	   self-­‐focus	   in	  
social	   anxiety	   (Clark	   &	  Wells,	   1995),	   others	   promote	   the	   simultaneous	   functioning	   of	   internal	   and	  
external	  processing	  bias	  to	  potentially	   threatening	  cues	  (Rapee	  &	  Heimberg,	  1997).	  Evidence	   for	   the	  
latter	  account	  comes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  sensitivity	  to	  negative	  evaluations,	  difficulties	  in	  ignoring	  threats,	  
allocating	  attention	  to	  possible	  threats	  and	  a	  subsequent	  processing	  including	  hyperarousal	  and	  later	  
avoidance	   of	   threat	   cues	   (Schultz	   &	   Heimberg,	   2008).	   The	   extent	   to	   which	   these	   biases	   might	   be	  
attributable	   to	   effects	   of	   task	   load	   (e.g.	   attention	   capture	  within	   an	   emotion	  discrimination	   task)	  or	  
divergence	  in	  stimulus	  characteristics	  (usage	  of	  faces,	  pictures	  or	  written	  words	  as	  stimulus	  material)	  
needs	  further	  clarification.	  Angry	  faces	  or	  negative	  words	  as	  stutter	  or	  audience	  (both	  frequently	  used	  
in	   research)	   do	   not	   solely	   affect	   attention	   allocation	   in	   SAD	   but	   also	   in	   other	   anxiety	   disorders	   or	  
healthy	  subjects.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  matching	  of	  the	  threatening	  stimulus	  to	  the	  disorder	  at	  hand	  is	  crucial	  
for	  the	  understanding	  of	  attention	  processes	  underlying	  SAD	  (Heinrichs	  &	  Hofmann,	  2001).	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  the	  present	  research	  I	   focused	  on	  the	  processing	  of	  threat	  cues	  in	  SAD.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  
people	  suffering	  from	  SAD	  engage	  in	  a	  somewhat	  hampered	  (or	  biased)	  processing	  of	  threat	  cues.	  Yet	  
the	  question	   remains	  whether	   this	  bias	  appears	   solely	   in	   response	   to	   specific	   threat	   cues,	  or	  also	   in	  
response	  to	  unspecific	  ones	  with	  respect	  to	  stimulus	  characteristics	  or	  disorder	  relevance.	  In	  contrast	  
to	   the	   large	  body	  of	   literature	  documenting	  attention	  processes	   in	   SAD	  using	  behavioral	  paradigms,	  
research	  using	  electroencephalographic	  (EEG)	  measures	   is	   scarce.	  The	  excellent	   temporal	  resolution	  
of	   EEG	   measures	   allows	   us	   to	   precisely	   determine	   changes	   within	   the	   processing	   stream,	   tracking	  
changes	   within	   milliseconds.	   The	   present	   thesis	   applies	   this	   advantage	   to	   study	   disorder	   specific	  
threat	  processing	  in	  SAD	  using	  socially	  threatening	  words	  and	  faces	  to	  contribute	  to	  existing	  cognitive	  
models	   (Amir,	   Elias,	   Klumpp,	   &	   Przeworski,	   2003,	   Clark	   &	  Wells,	   1995;	   Rapee	   &	   Heimberg,	   1997).	  
Social	   anxiety	   deters	   individuals	   from	   enjoying	   and	   satisfying	   one	   of	   our	   most	   natural	   and	   human	  
needs	   (i.e.	   the	  need	   for	   affiliation,	   the	   company	  of	   others	   or	   the	  need	   to	   be	   loved	  by	   others).	  While	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being	  aware	  of	  its	  limits,	  research	  on	  basic	  mechanisms	  underlying	  the	  oppressive	  symptoms	  of	  SAD	  
can	   contribute	   to	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   key	   symptoms	   and	  might	   help	   us	   develop	   possible	  
ways	  of	  change	  through	  psychotherapy.	  	  
2.2	  Definition	  of	  social	  anxiety	  disorder	  	  
	   A	  rapid	   fear	  response	  to	  an	   imminent	  physical	   threat	  is	  an	  adaptive	  mechanism	  ensuring	  the	  
survival	   of	   the	   individual.	   However,	   the	   fear	   in	   subjects	   with	   SAD	   is	   not	   about	   physical,	   but	  
interpersonal	  threats	  such	  as	  social	  isolation,	  negative	  evaluation,	  exclusion	  and/or	  rejection	  (Stein	  &	  
Stein,	  2008).	  Consequently,	  the	  hallmark	  of	  SAD	  is	  a	  clinically	  significant	  fear	  of	  exposure	  to	  unfamiliar	  
people	  or	  embarrassment	  in	  social	  or	  performance	  situations.	  This	  fear	  manifests	  itself	  in	  behavioral,	  
cognitive,	   affective	   and	   physiological	   dysfunctions	   (APA,	   2000).	   Phenomenologically,	   SAD	   either	  
appears	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   specific	   social	   situation	   (e.g.	   public	   speaking,	   fear	   of	   blushing)	   or	   as	   a	  
more	  general	  fear	  across	  various	  social	  situations	  including	  interpersonal	  and	  performance	  situations	  
(Kessler,	  Chiu,	  Demler,	  &	  Walters,	  2005).	  While	  avoidance	  of	  a	  feared	  situation	  or	  object	  is	  a	  necessary	  
feature	   for	   the	   diagnosis	   of	   most	   anxiety	   disorders	   (APA,	   2000),	   the	   feared	   situation	   in	   SAD	   must	  
either	   be	   “avoided	  or	   endured	  with	   intense	   distress”	   (APA,	   2000,	   p.	   417).	  Within	   a	   feared	   situation	  
patients	   generally	   experience	   physiological	   symptoms	   such	   as	   blushing,	   palpitations,	   trembling	   and	  
sweating.	   Some	   experience	   extensive	   fear	   due	   to	   the	   assumed	  visibility	   of	   these	   symptoms	   (Stein	  &	  
Bouwer,	   1997).	   Under	   intense	   fear,	   panic	   attacks	   can	   also	   occur	   (Rapee,	   Sanderson,	   McCauley,	   &	  
DiNardo,	  1992).	  Despite	  being	  aware	  that	  their	  fear	  might	  be	  exaggerated	  and/or	  unrealistic,	  patients	  
remain	  concerned	  that	   they	  might	  be	  observed	  and	  evaluated	  negatively	  which	   leads	  to	  anticipatory	  
anxiety	   (Schultz	   &	   Heimberg,	   2008).	   Symptoms	   typically	   cause	   significant	   distress	   and	   impaired	  
functioning	  in	  daily	  life	  including	  social,	  occupational	  and	  academic	  activities	  (APA,	  2000).	  It	  has	  been	  
suggested,	   that	  a	   fear	  structure	  underlying	  some	  anxiety	  disorders	   (Foa	  &	  Kozak,	  1986;	  Lang,	  1977)	  
and	  serving	  as	  a	  “blueprint	  for	  responding	  to	  danger”	  (Huppert	  &	  Foa,	  2004,	  p.	  213)	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  
SAD	   (Huppert	   &	   Foa,	   2004).	   The	   critical	   aspect	   distinguishing	   the	   fear	   network	   in	   SAD	   from	   other	  
anxiety	  disorders	  is	  that	  the	  feared	  stimulus	  is	  a	  social,	  rather	  than	  a	  physical	  threat	  (Huppert	  &	  Foa,	  
2004).	  Consequently,	  current	  etiological	  models	  of	  SAD	  (Ollendick	  &	  Hirschfeld-­‐Becker,	  2002;	  Rapee	  &	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Spence,	   2004)	   propose	   traumatic	   or	   conditioning	   events	   preceding	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   disorder	   in	   a	  
majority	  of	  patients.	  In	  sum,	  the	  marked	  psychological	  and	  social	  effects	  of	  SAD	  combined	  with	  a	  high	  
prevalence	   (Kessler	   et	   al.,	   2005)	   underline	   the	  need	   for	   further	   research	  on	  possible	   etiological	   and	  
maintaining	  factors.	  In	  recent	  years	  these	  factors	  have	  already	  been	  addressed	  in	  cognitive	  models	  of	  
SAD	  that	  will	  be	  reviewed	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  	  	  	  	  	  
2.3	  Cognitive	  models	  of	  social	  anxiety	  disorder	  	  
Beck	  &	  Emery,	  1985	   	  
One	  of	  the	  first	  to	  propose	  a	  cognitive	  model	  of	  anxiety	  based	  on	  his	  earlier	  contributions	  to	  the	  
study	  of	  affective	  disorders	  was	  Aeron	  T.	  Beck	  (Beck,	  1976;	  Beck,	  Emery,	  &	  Greenberg,	  1985).	  In	  Beck,	  
Emery	   and	   Greenberg´s	   cognitive	   model	   the	   authors	   emphasize	   the	   presence	   of	   distinct	   cognitive	  
schemata	   as	   one	   key	   element	   leading	   to	   anxiety.	   Schemata	   are	   developed	   through	   childhood	  
experiences	  via	  different	  forms	  of	  learning.	  A	  schema	  contains	  emotions,	  behaviors	  and	  cognitions	  that	  
are	  interconnected	  and	  influence	  how	  we	  perceive,	  process	  and	  interpret	  information,	  situations	  and	  
other	  people	  (Beck	  et	  al.,	  1985).	  The	  information	  about	  the	  threat	  value	  of	  a	  stimulus	  (e.g.	  expression	  
of	  others)	  and	  the	  resulting	  need	  for	  early	  detection	  is	  stored	  in	  such	  a	  schema.	  Additionally,	  Beck	  and	  
Emery	  argue	  that	  social	  anxiety	  is	  the	  product	  of	  faulty	  thinking.	  In	  this	  light,	  SAD	  subjects	  are	  not	  only	  
on	  the	  lookout	  for	  potential	  socially	  threatening	  cues,	  but	  they	  also	  persistently	  estimate	  the	  current	  
threat	  value	  and	  their	  own	  ability	  to	  cope	  with	  it.	  This	  idea	  is	  also	  supported	  by	  Leary	  and	  Kowalski´s	  
(1995)	   theory.	   In	   their	   self-­‐presentation	  model	  of	   social	  phobia	   the	  authors	   state	   that	   social	  anxiety	  
occurs	  when	  the	  individual	  is	  motivated	  to	  make	  a	  particular	  impression	  on	  others	  but	  has	  doubts	  that	  
he/she	   has	   the	   ability	   to	  make	   the	   desired	   impression	   (Leary	   &	   Kowalski,	   1995).	   According	   to	   the	  
schema	  congruency	  hypothesis,	  the	  resulting	  biases	  in	  threat	  processing	  should	  be	  connected	  with	  the	  
degree	  to	  which	  cues	  are	  systematically	  related	  to	  the	  personal	  schema	  (Beck	  et	  al,	  1985).	  As	  cognitive	  
biases	  hamper	  the	  realistic	  processing	  of	  a	  person´s	  ability	  and	  self-­‐efficiency	  (Beck	  et	  al.,	  1985),	  the	  
anticipated	   fear	   of	   negative	   experiences	   prevents	   the	   person	   to	   engage	   in	   social	   interactions	   and	  
maintains	  the	  anxiety.	  In	  sum	  then,	  pathological	  schema	  activation	  triggers	  symptoms	  of	  anxiety	  and	  
biased	  processing	  of	  social	  information.	  These	  schemata	  in	  turn	  are	  triggered	  by	  events	  or	  stimuli	  that	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match	   or	   support	   the	   schema	   and	   can	   distort	   different	   aspects	   of	   thinking,	   feeling	   and	   behavior	  
(Anderson,	  2010;	  Beck	  et	  al.,	  1985).	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	   In	  the	  1990´s	  a	  fruitful	  body	  of	  research	  inspired	  by	  Beck	  and	  colleagues´	  theoretical	  work	  led	  
to	  the	  formulation	  of	  two	  cognitive	  behavioral	  theories	  of	  social	  anxiety	  (Clark	  &	  Wells,	  1995;	  Rapee	  &	  
Heimberg,	   1997).	   While	   both	   models	   underline	   the	   central	   role	   of	   attention	   processes	   in	   the	  
maintenance	   of	   SAD,	   they	   disagree	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   focus	   of	   attention.	   Central	   aspects	   and	  
differences	  between	  both	  models	  are	  outlined	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  
Clark	  &	  Wells	  (1995)	  
	   According	  to	  Clark	  and	  Wells	  (1995),	  SAD	  subjects	  become	  anxious	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  detect	  an	  
audience.	  In	  line	  with	  Beck	  and	  colleagues	  (1985),	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  possess	  negative	  beliefs	  
and	  assumptions	  about	  social	   interactions	  and	  the	  self.	  Additionally,	   they	  anticipate	  that	  others	  have	  
high	   standards	   for	   the	  performance	  of	   their	   counterpart	   (Clark	  &	  Wells,	   1995).	   Consequently,	   these	  
assumptions	   trigger	  negative	   cognitions,	   leading	   the	   individual	   to	  believe	   that	   his/her	  behavior	  will	  
result	   in	   rejection	   or	   exclusion.	   The	  mere	   presence	   of	   others	   activates	   an	   “anxiety	   program”	   that	   is	  
followed	  by	  an	  automatic	  shift	  of	  attention	  (Clark	  &	  Wells,	  1995).	  From	  now	  on,	   the	  socially	  anxious	  
individual	  will	  tend	  to	  use	  interoceptive	  information	  (e.g.	  warm	  skin	  as	  sign	  of	  blushing)	  to	  build	  up	  an	  
impression	  of	  themselves	  (e.g.	   the	  “social	  self”).	  Because	  it	   is	  most	   likely	  that	  physiological	  arousal	   is	  
already	  elevated	  by	   the	  mere	  presence	  of	  others,	  physical	   signs	  of	   arousal	   (e.g.	   trembling,	   sweating,	  
palpitation)	  become	  reinforced	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  focus	  of	  attention.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  anxiety	  program	  
continues,	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  do	  not	  focus	  on	  others	  but	  monitor	  their	  bodily	  signs	  of	  anxiety.	  
This	  process	  creates	  a	  vivid	  but	  exacerbated	  image	  of	  the	  individual	  themselves	  (e.g.	  my	  entire	  body	  is	  
shaking)	  via	  cognitive	  and	  somatic	  feedback	  and	  is	  the	  key	  process	  in	  Clark	  and	  Wells´	  (1995)	  theory.	  
Moreover,	   the	   internal	   attention	   focus	   prevents	   the	   individual	   from	   noticing	   signs	   of	   approval	   or	  
acceptance	  and	  leaves	  fewer	  resources	  for	  the	  actual	  task	  effectively	  leading	  to	  poor	  performance.	  To	  
cope	  with	  their	  arousal	  and	  anxiety,	  social	  phobics	  engage	  in	  various	  compensatory	  behaviors	  (“safety	  
behavior”;	   Clark	  &	  Wells,	   1995).	   Although	   these	   behaviors	   are	   intended	   to	   reduce	   the	   possibility	   of	  
embarrassment	  and	  rejection	  (e.g.	  holding	  a	  glass	  so	  tightly	  that	  shaking	  of	  the	  hand	  is	  impossible),	  in	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many	   instances	   they	   make	   the	   feared	   outcome	   even	   more	   likely	   (e.g.	   holding	   a	   glass	   very	   tightly	  
increases	  muscle	   tension).	  However,	   the	  absence	  of	   the	   feared	  outcome	  is	  usually	  attributed	  to	  their	  
success	  in	  “surviving	  the	  catastrophe”	  by	  the	  use	  of	  safety	  behaviors	  (Clark	  &	  Wells,	  1995;	  Schultz	  &	  
Heimberg,	   2008).	  Another	   factor	   leading	   to	   exacerbated	   anxiety	   involves	   the	  post	   event	   processing:	  
social	   phobics`	   ruminating	   about	   their	   own	   performance.	   This	   process	   is	   distorted	   by	   the	   internal	  
attention	   biases	   and	   the	   activation	   of	   dysfunctional	   schemata.	   A	   critical	   issue	   in	   Clark	   and	   Wells’	  
theory	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  specify	  how	  the	  first	  initially	  threatening	  cue	  (i.e.	  the	  audience)	  is	  recognized	  
and	  perceived	  and	  which	  process	  or	  mechanism	  predicts	  an	  attention	  bias	  for	  threat	  cues	  over	  other	  
cues	  (Schultz	  &	  Heimberg,	  2008).	  
Rapee	  &	  Heimberg,	  1997	  
Extending	   the	   idea	   that	   SAD	   is	   predominantly	   associated	  with	   self-­‐focused	   attention,	   Rapee	  
and	   Heimberg	   emphasize	   that	   social	   phobics	   scan	   their	   environment	   for	   signs	   of	   impending	   social	  
disapproval	   or	   rejection	   (e.g.	   yawning)	   (Rapee	   &	   Heimberg,	   1997;	   Schultz	   &	   Heimberg,	   2008).	  
Sustained	   monitoring	   of	   the	   environment	   results	   in	   an	   unbalanced	   and	   faulty	   appraisal	   of	   social	  
situations.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  individuals	  attend	  to	  the	  mental	  representation	  of	  themselves	  consistent	  
with	  Clark	  and	  Wells	  (1995).	  Thus,	  when	  a	  socially	  anxious	  individual	  enters	  a	  social	  situation,	  he/she	  
will	  divide	  his/her	  attention	  resources	  to	  the	  environment	  and	  the	  self.	  Together,	  both	  attention	  biases	  
are	   crucial	   for	   the	   maintenance	   of	   SAD	   (Rapee	   &	   Heimberg,	   1997;	   Schultz	   &	   Heimberg,	   2008).	  
Moreover,	  the	  interaction	  of	  monitoring	  the	  environment	  for	  potential	  social	  threats	  and	  self-­‐focused	  
attention	  is	  not	  included	  in	  Clark	  and	  Wells’	  theory	  (1995).	  The	  individual	  will	  experience	  fear	  because	  
he/she	   is	   convinced	   that	   others	   are	   naturally	   critical	   and	   likely	   to	   engage	   in	   negative	   evaluations.	  
Immediately	  he/she	  will	  show	  vigilance	  for	  cues,	  which	  might	  predict	  this	  feared	  outcome	  (Schultz	  &	  
Heimberg,	  2008).	  Besides	  the	  mental	  image	  and	  external	  cues,	  several	  other	  sources	  for	  the	  evaluation	  
of	   outcomes	   are	   used.	   Consequently,	   past	   experiences,	   cognitions	   about	   social	   interactions,	   internal	  
and	  external	   information	  create	  an	  image	  of	  the	  self	  (“baseline	   image”).	  Subsequently,	  social	  phobics	  
scan	   the	  environment	   to	  gain	  evidence	   for	   this	  mental	   image	   (e.g.	   “this	  guy	   is	  yawning	  so	   I	  must	  be	  
boring”).	  As	  both	  attention	  foci	  constantly	  interact	  with	  each	  other,	  the	  detection	  of	  external	  signs	  of	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social	   threat	   results	   in	   a	   greater	   internal	   focus	   and	   vice	   versa.	   Conclusively,	   while	   Clark	   and	  Wells	  
(1995)	  suggest	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  mental	  representation	  of	  the	  self	  should	  solely	  exacerbate	  anxiety,	  
Rapee	   and	   Heimberg	   assume	   that	   an	   increased	   internal	   focus	   should	   also	   affect	   the	   external	   focus	  
(Rapee	  &	  Heimberg,	  1997;	  Schultz	  &	  Heimberg,	  2008).	  
Conclusively,	   virtually	   all	   cognitive	   models	   converge	   on	   the	   aspects	   that	   social	   anxious	  
individuals	   are	  overly	   concerned	  of	  how	   they	  might	  be	  perceived	  and	   that	   they	   show	  a	   self-­‐focused	  
attention	  bias	   (Beck	  et	  al.,	  1985;	  Clark	  &	  Wells,	  1995;	  Rapee	  &	  Heimberg,	  1997).	  However,	  whether	  
attention	   biases	   occur	   exclusively	  with	   regard	   to	   internal	   or	   simultaneously	  with	   regard	   to	   internal	  
and	  external	  sources	  of	  social	  threats	  remains	  a	  controversial	  conceptual	  question.	  Most	  importantly,	  
as	  differential	  biases	  are	  thought	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  subject’s	  personal	  schema	  and	  the	  systematics	   in	  
diagnosis	   (Beck	   et	   al.,	   1985;	   Heinrichs	   &	   Hofmann,	   2001),	   the	   specificity	   of	   attentional	   biases	  
(unspecific	  hypervigilance	  to	  all	  threatening	  versus	  to	  disorder	  specific	  stimuli)	  need	  further	  scientific	  
investigation.	  During	   the	   last	  decades	  considerable	   research	  effort	  has	  been	  devoted	   to	   clarify	   these	  
issues.	  A	  picture	  of	  research	  on	  information	  processing	  biases	  will	  be	  drawn	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  
2.4	   Cognitive	  and	  attention	  biases	  in	  social	  anxiety	  disorder	  	  
The	  cognitive	  models	  outlined	  above	  provide	  an	  excellent	  conceptual	  framework	  for	  studying	  
different	   attention	   biases	   in	   SAD.	   Accordingly,	   social	   anxiety	   manifests	   in	   vigilance	   for	   negative	  
evaluation,	  difficulties	   ignoring	   threats,	   altered	  allocation	  of	   attention	   in	   the	  environment	  as	  well	   as	  
memory,	   interpretation	  and	   judgmental	  biases	   (e.g.	  Heinrichs	  &	  Hofmann,	  2001).	  As	   theories	  do	  not	  
converge	  on	  the	  nature	  and	  mechanism	  of	  these	  biases,	  substantial	  research	  has	  been	  devoted	  to	  these	  
issues.	   Over	   the	   last	   decades,	   reviews	   on	   attention	   biases	   have	   documented	   evidence	   derived	   from	  
different	   behavioral	   attention	   paradigms	   (e.g.	   emotional	   stroop,	   dot	   probe,	   visual	   search,	   memory	  
tasks,	  face	  in	  the	  crowd	  paradigm)	  and	  stimulus	  categories	  (mainly	  words	  and	  faces)	  (for	  reviews	  see	  
Amir	   &	   Foa,	   2001;	   Heinrichs	   &	   Hofmann,	   2001;	   Hirsch	   &	   Clark,	   2004;	   Schultz	   &	   Heimberg,	   2008).	  
Biases	   have	  not	   only	   been	   reported	   for	   SAD,	   but	   also,	  more	   generally	   for	   anxious	   (Bar-­‐Haim,	   Lamy,	  
Pergamin,	  Bakermans-­‐Kranenburg,	  &	  Van	  Ijzendoorn,	  2007;	  Yiend,	  2010)	  or	  even	  healthy	  individuals	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(Mathews	  &	  MacLeaod,	  1994;	  Mathews	  &	  Mackintosh,	  1998).	  This	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  disorder-­‐
specificity	  of	  these	  biases	  (Bar-­‐Haim	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Yiend,	  2010).	  	  
Most	  cognitive	  models	  of	  visual	  attention	  propose	  that	  selective	  attention	  to	  threat	  cues	  is	  the	  
crucial	  process	  leading	  to	  exacerbating	  and	  maintenance	  of	  anxiety	  (MacLeod,	  Mathews,	  &	  Tata,	  1986;	  
Mogg	  &	  Bradley,	  1998;	  Williams,	  Watts,	  MacLeod,	  &	  Matthew,	  1997;	  Mathew	  &	  Mackintosh,	  1998).	  In	  
SAD	   these	   cues	   include	   negative	   facial	   expressions	   (anger	   or	   disgusted)	   or	   apparently	   disorder-­‐
specific	   words	   (e.g.	   stutter,	   embarrassment	   or	   shy;	   e.g.	   Becker,	   Rinck,	   Margraf,	   &	   Roth,	   2001).	  
However,	  it	  remains	  unclear	  if	  the	  increased	  attention	  to	  threat	  cues	  that	  is	  frequently	  absent	  in	  non-­‐
anxious	   controls	   (e.g.	   Mogg,	   Phlippot,	   &	   Bradley,	   2004;	   Pishyar,	   Harris,	   &	   Menzies,	   2004)	   arises	  
because	   these	   cues	   rapidly	   capture	   attention,	   delay	   the	   disengagement	   or	   both	   (Cisler,	   Bacon,	   &	  
Williams,	   2009;	   Yiend,	   2010).	   Another	   explanation	   for	   the	   occasional	   findings	   of	   attention	   biases	  
occurring	  in	  healthy	  controls	  is	  that	  threat	  cues	  can	  capture	  attention	  in	  everyone	  when	  they	  exceed	  a	  
critical	  threshold	  (Mathew	  &	  Mackintosch,	  1998;	  Mogg	  &	  Bradley,	  1998).	  	  
	   Another	  line	  of	  research	  suggests	  that	  another	  mechanism	  accounts	  for	  the	  observed	  pattern	  of	  
attention	  biases.	  Recently,	  studies	  using	  the	  modified	  Posner	  spatial	  cuing	  task	  (Posner,	  1980)	  showed	  
that	   anxious	   individuals	   are	   not	   faster	   in	   responding	   to	   probes	   replacing	   threatening	   compared	   to	  
neutral	  cues,	  but	  are	  somewhat	  slower	  in	  responding	  to	  cues	  that	  are	  opposite	  a	  threat	  cues,	  relative	  to	  
non-­‐anxious	  controls	  (Amir	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  Thus,	  once	  detected,	  the	  anxious	  individual	  fails	  to	  disengage	  
attention	   from	   the	   threatening	   cues	   (Amir	   et	   al.,	   2003;	   Fox	   et	   al.,	   2001,	   2002;	   Koster,	   Crombez,	  
Verschueren,	  &	  De	  Houwer,	  2004;	  Yiend	  &	  Mathews,	  2001).	  As	   a	   consequence,	   the	   likelihood	  of	   the	  
detection	   of	   threatening	   cues	   might	   be	   increased	   resulting	   in	   intensified	   anxiety	   (Mogg	   &	   Bradley,	  
2005).	   In	   this	   light	   the	   cost	   of	   attending	   to	   irrelevant	   social	   information	  might	   be	   the	  maintaining	  
factor	  underlying	  numerous	  anxiety	  disorders	  (Amir	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  
The	  mixed	  pattern	  of	  findings	  has	  also	  been	  subsumed	  within	  a	  model	  of	  consecutive	  stages	  of	  
threat	  processing.	  According	   to	   this	  model,	   the	  direction	  of	  attention	  biases	  changes	  as	  a	   function	  of	  
time.	  While	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  exhibit	  initial	  vigilance	  for	  threat	  cues,	  they	  immediately	  direct	  
their	   attention	   away	   from	   these	   cues	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   detailed	   processing	   and	   to	   minimize	   their	  
anxiety	   (Amir,	   Foa,	  &	   Coles,	   1998;	  Mogg	  &	  Bradley,	   1998).	   This	  hypervigilance-­‐avoidance	   hypothesis	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has	  been	  widely	  studied	  (Amir	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  Heinrichs	  &	  Hofmann,	  2001;	  Williams	  et	  al.,	  1997).	  While	  
some	  findings	  support	  the	  assumption	  of	  consecutive	  and	  inverted	  attention	  biases,	  others	  are	  clearly	  
inconsistent	   with	   the	   hypervigilance-­‐avoidance	   hypotheses	   (for	   discussions	   see	   Bögels	   &	   Mansell,	  
2004	  and	  Heinrichs	  &	  Hofmann,	  2001).	  	  
Different	  aspects	  may	  account	  for	  the	  mixed	  results	  regarding	  the	  direction	  (i.e.	  hypervigilance,	  
avoidance,	   difficulties	   in	   disengagement)	   of	   attention	   biases.	   First,	   studies	   vary	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  
population	   (clinical,	   sub-­‐clinical,	   healthy	  populations),	  making	   it	   difficult	   to	  disentangle	  pathological	  
from	   normal	   attention	   processes	   (Amir	   et	   al.,	   2003).	   In	   clinical	   sample,	   this	   issue	   can	   be	   further	  
exacerbated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   comorbid	   disorders,	   particularly	   depressive	   disorders	   (Grant	   &	   Beck,	  
2006;	   Musa,	   Lépine,	   Clark,	   Mansell,	   &	   Ehlers,	   2003)	   have	   shown	   to	   influence	   and	   even	   eliminate	  
attention	  biases	  in	  anxiety.	  Second,	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  presented	  findings	  are	  based	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  
different	   paradigms,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   each	   paradigm	   taps	   into	   different	   stages	   of	   attention	   processes	  
(Bar-­‐Haim	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Finally,	  most	  studies	  differ	  with	  regard	  to	  stimulus	  material	  and	  duration	  of	  
presentation,	  further	  complicating	  the	  integration	  of	  their	  findings.	  Main	  achievements	  from	  research	  
using	  behavioral	  paradigms	  will	  be	  briefly	  outlined	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  
2.4.1	  Evidence	  from	  behavioral	  paradigms	  
	   As	   noted	   earlier,	   most	   studies	   of	   attention	   biases	   in	   social	   anxiety	   have	   utilized	   either	   a	  
modified	  version	  of	  the	  emotional	  stroop	  (Stroop,	  1935),	  or	  the	  modified	  dot	  probe	  task	  (MacLeod	  et	  
al.,	   1986).	   In	   the	   emotional	   stroop	   task,	   words	   of	   varying	   emotional	   connotation	   (neutral,	   positive,	  
negative)	   are	   written	   in	   different	   colors.	   Subjects	   are	   asked	   to	   name	   the	   color	   of	   the	   word	   while	  
ignoring	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   word.	   Longer	   color	   naming	   latencies	   are	   assumed	   to	   arise	   from	  
interferences	  that	  occur	  when	  attention	   is	  allocated	  to	  the	  meaning	   instead	  to	  the	  color	  of	   the	  word.	  
Research	  utilizing	  the	  task	  generally	  shows	  that	  socially	  anxious	  subjects	  take	  longer	  to	  name	  the	  color	  
of	  a	  socially	  threatening	  word	  (e.g.	  stupid)	  than	  non-­‐anxious	  subjects	  (Amir	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  Hope,	  Rapee,	  
Heimberg,	  &	  Dombeck,	  1990;	  Mattia,	  Heimberg,	  &	  Hope,	  1993;	  Van	  Niekerk,	  Moller,	  &	  Nortje,	  1999).	  
Findings	  are	  typically	  assumed	  to	  reflect	  attention	  allocation	  towards	  social	  threat	  cues.	  However,	  the	  
emotional	  stroop	  task	  has	  been	  heavily	  criticized	  as	  being	  an	  incorrect	  measure	  of	  attention.	  Acording	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to	   this	   critique,	   delayed	   response	   times	   may	   only	   be	   due	   to	   actual	   emotional	   arousal	   arising	   from	  
reading	   an	   emotional	   word.	   This	   in	   turn	   may	   hamper	   the	   actual	   performance,	   leading	   to	   slower	  
responses.	  Consequently,	   it	  has	  been	   speculated	   that	   it	   is	   the	  emotional	   arousal	   instead	  of	   attention	  
allocation	  that	  modulates	  the	  emotional	  stroop	  effect	  (Mogg	  &	  Bradley,	  1998).	  	  
	   In	  reaction	  to	  the	  criticisms	  regarding	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  social	  stroop	  task	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  
that	  the	  dot	  probe	  task	  represents	  a	  more	  direct	  measure	  of	  visual	  attention	  (Mogg	  &	  Bradley,	  1998;	  
MacLeod	  et	  al.,	  1986).	  In	  the	  dot	  probe	  task	  subject	  are	  initially	  presented	  with	  a	  fixation	  marker	  (×	  or	  
)	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  screen.	  Markers	  are	  then	  followed	  by	  a	  pair	  of	  either	  words	  or	  faces	  that	  appear	  
either	  horizontally	  or	  vertically	  to	  each	  other.	  Typically	  one	  word	  or	  face	  is	  neutral	  and	  the	  other	  has	  a	  
negative	   or	   positive	   valence.	   Usually,	   both	   stimuli	   remain	   on	   the	   screen	   for	   usually	   500	   to	   1500	  
milliseconds.	   Subsequently,	   the	   stimuli	   disappear	   and	   a	   probe	   appears	   on	   one	   of	   the	   locations	  
previously	  occupied	  by	  the	  stimuli.	  Subjects	  are	  briefed	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  probe	  as	  
quick	   as	   possible	   by	   indicating	   its	   position	   (right/	   left,	   up/down).	   Quicker	   responses	   to	   probes	  
replacing	  an	  emotionally	  negative	  cue	  are	  thought	  to	  indicate	  a	  bias	  towards	  threat.	  The	  dot	  probe	  is	  
thought	   to	   offer	   several	   advantages	   over	   the	   emotional	   stroop	   task	   (for	   a	   detailed	   description	   see	  
Mogg	  &	  Bradley,	  1998;	  MacLeod	  et	  al.,	  1986).	  These	  advantages	  spawned	  numerous	  studies	  measuring	  
attention	   processes	   in	   samples	   of	   clinical	   and	   non-­‐clinical	   social	   anxiety	   (for	   reviews	   see	   Mogg	   &	  
Bradley,	   1998,	   1999).	   While	   some	   studies	   utilized	   threatening	   words	   (Asmundson	   &	   Stein,	   1994)	  
others	   used	   threatening	   faces	   (Mansell,	   Clark,	   Ehlers,	   &	   Chen,	   1999;	   Chen,	   Ehlers,	   Clark,	   &	  Mansell,	  
2002;	  Mogg	  &	  Bradley,	  2002;	  Pishyar	  et	  al.,	   2004),	  yielding	  mixed	  results.	   In	  non-­‐clinical	   samples	  of	  
social	  anxiety,	  evidence	  has	  been	  reported	   for	  an	  avoidance	  (e.g.	  Mansell	  et	  al.,	  1999),	  vigilance	  (e.g.	  
Mogg	  &	  Bradley,	  2002;	  Mogg	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Pishyar	  et	  al.,	  2004)	  or	  none	  of	  both	  attention	  biases	   (e.g.	  
Bradley,	   Mogg,	   Millar,	   &	   Bonham-­‐Carter,	   1997;	   Pineles	   &	   Mineka,	   2005).	   In	   clinical	   samples,	   most	  
evidence	   has	   been	   reported	   for	   the	   avoidance	   (Chen	   et	   al.,	   2002),	   the	   vigilance	   (Sposari	   &	   Rapee,	  
2007)	  or	  the	  hypervigilance-­‐avoidance	  hypothesis	  (Mogg	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  Unfortunately,	   the	  majority	  of	  
research	  lacks	  the	  possibility	  of	  direct	  comparisons	  due	  to	  methodological	   issues	  as	  time	  of	  stimulus	  
presentation,	  type	  of	  stimulus	  or	  facial	  expression.	  By	  now,	  the	  dot	  probe	  task	  widely	  accepted	  as	  the	  
most	  methodological	  sound	  measure	  of	  visual	  attention	  biases	  (Mogg	  &	  Bradley,	  1998).	  However,	  due	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to	  the	  nature	  of	  attention	  biases	  in	  anxiety,	  one	  issue	  should	  be	  emphasized.	  In	  light	  of	  an	  evolutionary	  
advantage,	   the	   processing	   of	   threatening	   cues,	   regardless	   of	   their	   origin	   or	   valence	   (physical	   versus	  
social	   threat),	  would	  only	  be	  adaptive	   if	   the	  detection	  and	  further	  processing	  occur	  very	  quickly	  and	  
thus	  protects	  the	  individual	  from	  impending	  harm	  (LeDoux,	  2000).	  Unfortunately,	  a	  critical	  limitation	  
of	  most	   behavioral	   paradigms	   is	   that	   they	  only	  provide	   an	   indirect	  measure	  of	   attention	  processing	  
(Horley,	   Williams,	   Gonsalvez,	   &	   Gordon,	   2004)	   and	   thus,	   are	   incapable	   of	   mapping	   fine	   temporal	  
dynamics.	   Moreover,	   behavioral	   measures	   can	   be	   confounded	   with	   post-­‐perceptual	   processes	   (e.g.	  
decision	   making,	   motor	   response)	   (Bar-­‐Haim	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Handy,	   Green,	   Klein,	   &	   Mangun,	   2001).	  
Consequently,	   a	   fruitful	   body	   of	   research	   using	   different	  measures	   of	   brain	   activity	  mainly	   through	  
event-­‐related	   potentials	   (ERPs)	   has	   focused	   on	   attention	   processes	   in	   anxiety.	   ERPs	   offer	   the	  
advantage	   of	   studying	   fine	   temporal	   dynamics	   in	   stimulus	   processing	   (Mueller,	   Hofmann,	   Santesso,	  
Meuret,	  Bitran,	  &	  Pizzagalli,	  2009).	  Thereby,	  attention	  processes	  can	  be	  traced	  more	  directly,	  allowing	  
circumventing	  some	  of	  the	  limitations	  attached	  to	  behavioral	  paradigms.	  	  	  
2.4.2	  Evidence	  from	  electrophysiological	  research	  
By	  now,	  it	  is	  widely	  accepted	  that	  attention	  biases	  manifest	  themselves	  in	  different	  ERPs	  of	  the	  
human	   EEG.	   These	   components	   differ	   in	   amplitude,	   frequency,	   polarity	   and	   onset.	   In	   general,	   they	  
provide	  a	  measure	  of	  cortical	  activity	  provoked	  by	  passive	  and	  active	  forms	  of	  attentional	  control	  and	  
processing	  (Hopfinger,	  Luck,	  &	  Hillyard,	  2004).	  Different	  ERPs	  are	  known	  to	  covary	  with	  the	  amount	  of	  
processing	   resources	   (Hopfinger	   et	   al.,	   2004).	   The	   larger	   their	   amplitude,	   the	   more	   processing	  
resources	   are	   engaged.	   Different	   ERP	   components	   are	   modulated	   by	   selective	   attention	   (Eimer	   &	  
Driver,	  2001;	  Luck,	  Woodman,	  &	  Vogel,	  2000),	  conveniently	  qualifying	  them	  for	  the	  study	  of	  anxiety.	  
For	  a	  detailed	  overview	  of	  ERP	  components,	  their	  functional	  associations	  and	  specific	  neurocognitive	  
aspects,	  see	  Luck	  and	  Kappenman	  (2011).	  
	  To	  date	  no	  EEG	  study	  has	  addressed	  the	  influence	  of	  social	  anxiety	  on	  the	  cortical	  processing	  
of	  emotional	  words.	  However,	  research	  focusing	  on	  the	  processing	  of	  emotional	  faces	  in	  SAD	  is	  fairly	  
comprehensive.	   An	   impact	   of	   emotion	   expression	   on	   early	   perceptual	   (P100),	   face	   specific	   (N170,	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N205r)	  as	  well	  as	  early	  (EPN)	  and	  late	  emotion	  related	  (N400	  and	  LPP)	  components	  is	  evident,	  while	  
not	  always	  concordant.	  	  
In	  a	   series	  of	   studies	  Kolassa	  and	  colleagues	   investigated	   cortical	   characteristics	  of	   attention	  
biases	  to	  angry,	  sad,	  happy	  and	  neutral	  faces.	  Using	  a	  modified	  emotional	  stroop	  task,	  subjects	  in	  one	  
study	  had	  to	  identify	  either	  the	  gender	  or	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  face	  (Kolassa	  &	  Miltner,	  2006).	  Unlike	  
controls	   subjects	   with	   SAD,	   they	   showed	   enhanced	   right	   temporo-­‐parietal	   N170	   amplitudes	   in	  
response	  to	  angry	  faces.	  However,	  phobics	  showed	  no	  deviations	  to	  controls	  in	  early	  P100	  and	  P200	  
amplitudes	   to	   angry	   faces	   albeit	   P100	   amplitude	   was	   enhanced	   in	   SAD	   to	   all	   facial	   expressions.	  
Comparing	   social	   phobics	   with	   healthy	   controls	   and	   spider	   phobics,	   these	   results	   were	   partly	  
replicated.	   In	   reaction	   to	   schematic	   faces	   presenting	   different	   emotional	   expressions	   (angry,	   happy,	  
neutral)	  generally	  enhanced	  P100	  amplitudes	   to	  all	   faces	  were	  exclusively	   found	   in	  SAD	  patients.	  At	  
the	  same	  time,	  an	  enhanced	  right-­‐hemispheric	  N170	  only	  to	  emotional	  faces	  was	  evident	  in	  all	  subjects	  
(Kolassa,	  Kolassa,	  Musial,	  &	  Miltner,	  2007).	  In	  a	  third	  study,	  patients	  (SAD	  and	  spider	  phobics)	  showed	  
enhanced	  P100	  amplitudes	  to	  all	  faces,	  probably	  indicating	  a	  state	  of	  general	  hypersensitivity,	  while	  a	  
modulation	   of	   the	   N170	   by	   facial	   expression	   did	   not	   discriminate	   between	   patients	   and	   controls	  
(Kolassa	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   The	   finding	   of	   enhanced	   right	   temporo-­‐parietal	   N170	   in	   SAD	   has	   also	   been	  
reported	   in	   subclinical	   social	   anxiety	   within	   a	   passive	   viewing	   task	   (Mühlberger	   et	   al.,	   2009).	  
Mühlberger	   and	   colleagues	   also	   reported	   that	   in	   highly	   socially	   anxious	   subjects,	   the	   P100	   was	  
enhanced	  in	  response	  to	  all	  faces,	  while	  emotional	  modulation	  of	  the	  early	  posterior	  negativity	  (EPN)	  
was	   specific	   to	   emotional	   faces	   (Mühlberger	   et	   al.,	   2009.	  Moreover,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  modulation	   of	  
early	  perceptual	  and	  face	  specific	  components	  is	  not	  limited	  to	   trait	  social	  anxiety.	  When	  state	  social	  
anxiety	   is	   induced	   by	   a	   fear	   of	   public	   speaking,	   N170	   amplitudes	   are	   observed	   for	   angry	   faces	  
compared	  to	  other	  facial	  expressions	  (Wieser,	  Pauli,	  Reicherts,	  &	  Mühlberger,	  2010).	  	  
Looking	  at	  later	  stages	  within	  the	  processing	  stream,	  enhanced	  later	  ERP	  responses	  (e.g.	  P300,	  
LPP)	   to	   threatening	   faces	   in	   general	   have	  been	   reported	   in	  other	   studies	   (Moser,	  Huppert,	  Duval,	  &	  
Simons,	   2008;	   Sewell,	   Palermo,	   Atkinson,	   &	   McArthur,	   2008).	   For	   instance,	   Moser	   and	   colleagues	  
reported	  enhanced	  late	  LPP	  responses	  to	  threatening	  faces	  (anger,	  disgusted)	  in	  a	  modified	  Erickson	  
flanker	   task.	   The	   authors	   speculate	   that	   this	   finding	  might	   indicate	   that	   SAD	   is	   associated	  with	   the	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absence	   of	   a	   positive	   processing	   bias	   in	   favor	   of	   a	   negative	   processing	   bias	   (Moser	   et	   al.,	   2008).	  
Evidence	  for	  a	  directional	  change	  of	  attention	  biases	  comes	  from	  a	  study	  by	  Mueller	  et	  al.	  The	  authors	  
presented	  subjects	  suffering	  from	  SAD	  and	  healthy	  control	  subjects	  with	  angry-­‐neutral	  and	  happy-­‐neutral	  
pairs	  of	  faces	  within	  a	  dot	  probe	  task.	  Unlike	  controls,	  social	  phobics	  showed	  enhanced	  P100	  potentials	  
to	   angry-­‐neutral	   compared	   to	   happy-­‐neutral	   face	   pairs.	   More	   importantly,	   compared	   to	   controls’	  
reactions	  to	  probes	  replacing	  angry-­‐neutral	  versus	  happy-­‐neutral	  face	  pairs	  yielded	  in	  decreased	  P100	  
amplitudes.	   The	   authors	   interpret	   their	   findings	   as	   evidence	   for	   the	   hypervigilance-­‐avoidance	  
hypothesis,	  stating	  that	  the	  direction	  of	  attention	  biases	  changes	  as	  a	  function	  of	  time.	  	  
Another	   method	   of	   analyzing	   electrophysiological	   activity	   in	   response	   to	   threat	   cues	   is	   the	  
stimulus-­‐dependent	   modulation	   of	   oscillatory	   brain	   activity.	   In	   particular,	   α	   frequency	   activations	  
have	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  directly	  associated	  with	  distinct	  cognitive	  processes	  (i.e.	  inhibition).	  Cognitive	  
inhibition	   can	   be	   mapped	   on	   to	   distinct	   regions	   of	   the	   prefrontal	   cortex	   (PFC;	   Aron,	   Robbins,	   &	  
Poldrack,	  2004)	  The	  PFC	  exerts	   its	   inhibitory	  control	  on	  subcortical	   regions	   to	   implement	  executive	  
control	   (Aron	   et	   al.,	   2004).	   This	   functional	   role	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   be	   associated	   with	   frontal	   α	  
oscillations	   in	   the	   human	   EEG	   (Davidson,	   Marshall,	   Tomarken,	   &	   Henriques,	   2000)	   with	   different	  
anxiety	  related	  correlates	  (i.e.	  approach	  and	  withdrawal	  related	  behavior)	  for	  right	  and	  left	  frontal	  α	  
activity	  (Davidson	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Heller,	  Nitschke,	  Etienne,	  &	  Miller,	  1997).	  In	  fact,	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  
right-­‐sided	  brain	  activity	   (reduced	  α	  activity)	   increases	   in	  anxious	  subjects	  while	   listening	   to	   fearful	  
and	  sad	  narratives	  compared	  to	  nonanxious	  subjects	  (Heller	  et	  al.,	  1997).	  Furthermore,	  greater	  right-­‐
sided	  activity	  (reduced	  α	  activity)	  in	  the	  PFC	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  correlate	  positively	  with	  anxiety	  (Coan	  
&	  Allen,	  2004;	  Heller	  &	  Nietschke,	  1998;	  Davidson	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Heller	  et	  al.,	  1997).	  So	  far,	  patterns	  of	  
event-­‐related	  cortical	  activity	  in	  social	  anxiety	  are	  mixed	  and	  more	  research	  is	  needed,	  especially	  with	  
clinical	  forms	  of	  social	  anxiety.	  Indeed,	  current	  research	  assessing	  oscillations	  in	  frontal	  regions	  of	  the	  
brain	  typically	  measures	  α	  desynchronization	  while	  subjects	  anticipated	  a	  public	  speech	  (Davidson	  et	  
al.,	  2000),	  reading	  anxious	  and	  sad	  narratives	  (Heller	  et	  al.,	  1997)	  or	  during	  resting	  periods	  (Heller	  et	  
al.,	   1997;	   Shackerman,	  McMenamin,	   Maxwell,	   Greischar,	   &	   Davidson,	   2009).	   In	   sum,	   support	   for	   the	  
activation	   of	   fear	   relevant	   structures	   by	   emotional	   faces	   in	   SAD	   via	   various	   measures	   of	   cortical	  
activity	  derives	  from	  hemodynamic	  imaging	  studies	  that	  parallel	  the	  electrophysiological	  evidence.	  By	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measuring	   the	   cerebral	   blood	   flow,	   studies	   applying	   functional	  magnetic	   resonance	   imaging	   (fMRI)	  
suggest	  activation	  of	   the	  brainʼs	   fear	  circuitry	  when	  socially	  anxious	  participants	  view	  social	  stimuli.	  
This	  has	  been	  shown	  for	  angry	  (Evans	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Phan	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Straube	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Stein	  et	  al.,	  
2002),	  but	  also	  to	  neutral	  (Veit	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Birbaumer	  et	  al.,	  1998)	  and	  even	  happy	  faces	  (Straube	  et	  
al.,	  2005).	  Taken	  together	  the	  evidence	  is	  inconclusive	  and	  may	  points	  to	  a	  more	  general	   fear	  system	  
activation	   bias	   in	   response	   to	   –	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	   specific	   fear	   system	   activation	   bias	   in	   response	   to	  
certain	   types	   of	   faces	   (e.g.	   angry	   faces)	   –	   in	   social	   anxiety.	   However,	   the	   time	   course	   and	   schema	  
and/or	  disorder	  specificity	  remain	  unclear.	  
2.5	   Integrating	  the	  present	  research	  
The	   present	   dissertation	   rests	   on	   three	   manuscripts.	   The	   first	   manuscript	   aimed	   at	  
investigating	  to	  which	  extent	  previous	  evidence	  for	  attention	  biases	  can	  be	  transferred	  to	  stimuli	  that	  
are	  associated	  with	  a	   social	   rather	   than	  a	  physical	   threat.	  This	   study	  measured	  ERPs	   in	   response	   to	  
socially	   threatening	  words	   in	   a	   sample	   of	   healthy	   subjects.	   In	   Study	   #2	  we	   extended	   findings	   from	  
Study	   #1	   and	   investigated	   whether	   attention	   biases	   in	   SAD	   can	   be	   transferred	   to	   a	   general	  
hypersensitivity	   or	   are	   specific	   to	   disorder-­‐relevant	   socially	   threatening	   words.	   In	   addition,	   we	  
assessed	  how	  these	  biases	  can	  be	  traced	  with	  analyses	  of	  oscillatory	  brain	  activity	  Finally,	  in	  Study	  #3	  
we	   examined	   if	   attention	   biases	   in	   SAD	   are	   also	   evident	   in	   response	   to	   socially	   threatening	   faces.	  
Furthermore,	  Study	  #2	  and	  #3	  also	  sought	  to	  assess	  the	  time	  course	  of	  attention	  biases	  in	  SAD.	  	  
As	  outlined	  above,	  previous	  research	  examining	  attention	  biases	  in	  healthy	  or	  anxious	  subjects	  
has	   predominantly	   used	   facial	   expressions	   or	   emotional	   pictures	   as	   stimuli	   (e.g.	   Eimer	   &	   Holmes,	  
2002,	   2007;	   Junghöfer	   et	   al.,	   2001;	   Schupp	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   Schupp,	   Flaisch,	   Stockburger,	   &	   Junghöfer,	  
2006).	   However,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   reasons	   to	   assume	   that	   words	   should	   equally	   serve	   as	  
motivationally	   relevant	   stimuli.	   Most	   humans	   are	   socialized	   via	   verbal	   learning	   processes.	  
Consequently	   then,	   the	   affective	   value	   of	   a	   stimulus	   does	   not	   need	   to	   be	   transported	  by	   the	   stimuli	  
itself	  (e.g.	  a	  snake)	  but	  can	  be	  triggered	  by	  the	  word.	  	  Indeed,	  if	  someone	  tells	  us	  about	  the	  dangerous	  
nature	   of	   a	   stimulus,	   we	   usually	   adopt	   a	   similar	   fear	   reaction	   as	   when	   being	   confronted	   with	   the	  
stimulus	   itself	   (Phelps	   et	   al.,	   2001).	   On	   a	   neural	   level,	   words	   are	   even	   associated	   with	   a	   similar	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activation	  in	  brain	  structures	  that	  are	  usually	  activated	  when	  confronted	  with	  the	  stimulus	  itself	  (e.g.	  
Herbert,	   2007).	   Additionally,	   it	   is	   generally	   accepted	   that	   emotional	   stimuli	   become	   reinforced	   by	  
means	   of	   different	   types	   of	   learning	   such	   as	   associative	   learning,	   priming,	   or	   by	   the	   significance	   an	  
individual	  ascribes	  to	  the	  stimuli	  (e.g.	  Adolphs,	  2003;	  Öhman,	  Flykt,	  &	  Esteves,	  2001;	  LeDoux,	  2000).	  
Consequently,	   research	   using	   emotional	   words	   in	   behavioral	   and	   ERP	   studies	   has	   yielded	   similar	  
results	  as	  research	  using	  affective	  pictures,	  faces	  and	  sounds.	  Databases	  comprising	  emotional	  words	  
became	  more	   prominent	   during	   the	   last	   decades	   (e.g.	   Bradley	   &	   Lang,	   1999;	   Herbert,	   Junghöfer,	   &	  
Kissler,	   2008).	   However,	  while	   electroencephalographic	   research	   assessing	   the	   impact	   of	   emotional	  
faces	  in	  SAD	  is	  frequent	  (e.g.	  Kissler,	  Assadollahi,	  &	  Herbert,	  2006),	  comparably	  little	  is	  known	  about	  
emotional	   word	   processing	   in	   SAD.	   Recent	   studies	   reporting	   biased	   word	   processing	   in	   SAD	   only	  
applied	  behavioral	  measures	  that	  did	  not	  allow	  for	  analyzing	  fine	  temporal	  dynamics.	  	  
Furthermore,	   the	   specificity	   of	   these	   effects	   is	   still	   unclear.	   Among	   those	   who	   applied	  
emotional	  words,	  no	  study	  distinguished	  between	  their	  physical	  and	  social	  connotations.	  One	  goal	  of	  
the	  first	  study	  was	  to	  fill	  this	  gap	  and	  examine	  whether	  reported	  effects	  of	  emotional	  word	  processing	  
(e.g.	   Kissler	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Scott,	   O`Donnell,	   Leuthold,	   &	   Sereno,	   2009)	   can	   be	   found	   using	   socially	  
threatening	   words,	   i.e.	   abusive	   swear	   words	   (or	   insults:	   see	   appendix	   A).	   A	   strong	   self-­‐reference	  
combined	  with	   a	   negative	   social	   connotation	   indicate	   their	   usefulness	   for	   the	   study	   of	   social	   threat	  
processing.	   Swear	   words	   serve	   as	   a	   cue	   for	   an	   endangered	   social	   integrity	   (i.e.	   rank	   or	   group	  
affiliation),	  possibly	  leading	  to	  social	  exclusion	  (Leary,	  1990;	  Williams,	  2001).	  As	  humans	  share	  a	  basic	  
need	   for	   affiliation	   and	   social	   inclusion	   (Baumeister	   &	   Leary,	   1995)	   socially	   threatening	   situations	  
have	  shown	  to	  elicit	  intense	  emotional,	  behavioral	  and	  physiological	  stress	  responses	  (for	  a	  discussion	  
see	   Corr,	   2005;	  MacDonald	  &	   Leary,	   2010,	   2005).	   The	   purpose	   of	   Study	  #1	  was	   to	   identify	   cortical	  
responses	   to	   abusive	   swear	  words	   in	   a	   sample	   of	   healthy	   subjects.	   The	  main	   findings	   indicate	   that	  
socially	  threatening	  words	  provoke	  a	  unique	  pattern	  of	  cortical	  response.	  While	  semantic	  processing	  
resembles	   the	   level	   of	   other	   affective	   words	   (e.g.	   Kissler	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Scott	   et	   al.,	   2009),	   facilitated	  
processing	   at	   early	   stages	   was	   limited	   to	   positive	   and	   physically	   threatening	   words.	   Moreover,	  
memory	   retrieval	   accuracy	   for	   socially	   threatening	   words	   was	   similar	   to	   that	   for	   physically	  
threatening	  words.	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   Whereas	   the	   first	   study	   addressed	   social	   threat	   processing	   in	   healthy	   subjects,	   Study	   #2	  
investigated	   attention	   biases	   in	   SAD.	   The	   aim	   of	   the	   Study	   was	   to	   determine	   the	   specificity	   (e.g.	  
Heinrichs	  &	  Hofmann,	  2001)	  and	  temporal	  dynamics	  of	  attention	  biases	  using	  the	  same	  experimental	  
paradigm	  as	  Study	  #1.	  Importantly,	  it	  included	  analyses	  of	  oscillatory	  activity	  during	  passive	  viewing	  
of	  emotional	  words.	  As	  outlined	  above,	  recent	  research	  on	  the	   impact	  of	  social	  anxiety	  on	  emotional	  
word	  processing	  suffers	  from	  two	  methodological	  limitations.	  First,	  the	  specificity	  hypothesis	  predicts	  
differential	  biases	  in	  subjects	  with	  anxiety	  disorder	  depending	  on	  the	  individual	  and	  disorder-­‐relevant	  
schema	   (e.g.	   Heinrichs	   &	   Hofmann,	   2001;	   Mathews	   &	   MacLeod,	   1994).	   Tests	   of	   this	   assumption	  
yielded	  mixed	  results	  (Asmundson	  &	  Stein,	  1994;	  Becker	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Hope	  et	  al.,	  1990;	  Mattia	  et	  al.,	  
1993;	  Wilson	  &	  MacLeod,	  2003),	  probably	  due	   to	  methodological	   limitations	   (Heinrichs	  &	  Hofmann,	  
2001).	   Moreover,	   the	   relevance	   of	   abusive	   swear	   words	   for	   the	   social	   self	   should	   be	   particularly	  
evident	   in	   socially	   anxious	   subjects.	   Second,	   no	   study	   to	   date	   has	   applied	   electroencephalographic	  
measures	  to	  investigate	  emotional	  word	  processing	  in	  SAD.	  Given	  the	  idea	  that	  threat	  processing	  can	  
occur	  pre-­‐attentively	  and	  without	  conscious	  processing	  (Yiend,	  2010),	  behavioral	  paradigms	  may	  not	  
be	   capable	  of	  mapping	   these	   fast	   temporal	  processes.	  Measuring	  ERPs	  however	   allows	   for	   excellent	  
temporal	  resolutions.	  	  
The	   time	   course	   of	   threat	   processing	   is	   another	   critical	   aspect	   of	   current	   research.	   As	  
mentioned	  above,	  attention	  biases	  differ	   in	   their	  direction	   (avoidance,	  hypervigilance)	  and	   temporal	  
dynamics	  (e.g.	  sustained/	  early	  hypervigilance	  or	  hypervigilance-­‐avoidance).	  Research	  on	  this	  topic	  is	  
fairly	  inconclusive	  and	  reveals	  a	  mixed	  pattern	  of	  results.	  Therefore,	  the	  second	  aim	  of	  Study	  #2	  was	  to	  
disentangle	  the	  time	  course	  of	  attention	  biases	  in	  SAD.	  Based	  on	  the	  body	  of	  ERP	  literature	  on	  SAD,	  we	  
expected	   to	   find	   a	   hypervigilance	   among	   subjects	   with	   SAD,	   with	   an	   increased	   specificity	   in	  
consecutive	   ERP	   components.	   As	   evidence	   for	   later	   avoidance	   is	   rare,	   the	   analyses	   of	   correlates	   of	  
avoidance	   was	   rather	   explorative.	   In	   sum,	   subjects	   with	   SAD	   showed	   blunted	   sensory	   processing	  
(P100)	  followed	  by	  a	  rapid	  processing	  of	  emotional	  words	  during	  early	  stages	  (EPN).	  At	  later	  stages,	  
all	  subjects	  showed	  enhanced	  processing	  of	  negative	  (physically	  and	  socially	  threatening)	  compared	  to	  
neutral	  and	  positive	  words	  (N400).	  Most	  importantly,	  frontal	  α	  activity	  (as	  inverse	  measure	  of	  cortical	  
activation)	   was	   increased	   for	   negative	   words	   in	   SAD	   compared	   to	   controls.	   These	   findings	   are	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consistent	  with	  a	  general	  avoidance	  and	  more	  specifically	  with	  the	  deactivation	  of	  a	  threat	  detection	  
system	   at	   late	   stages	   of	   stimulus	   processing	   that	   is	   limited	   to	   SAD.	   Taken	   together,	   these	   results	  
suggest	   that	  under	  certain	  conditions	  swear	  words	  are	  processed	  similarly	   to	  physically	   threatening	  
words.	  Overall,	  our	  study	   lends	  support	  for	  an	  increase	  of	  specificity	  in	  the	  time	  course	  of	  emotional	  
word	  processing	  in	  SAD	  that	  finally	  leads	  to	  cognitive	  avoidance.	  	  
	   Research	  presented	  in	  Study	  #3	  applied	  the	  same	  experimental	  paradigms	  introduced	  in	  Study	  
#1	  and	  #2.	  By	  presenting	  facial	  expressions	  we	  extended	  our	  findings	  reported	  in	  Study	  #2.	  This	  helps	  
answering	   the	   question	   whether	   facial	   expressions	   displaying	   a	   physical	   (i.e.	   anger)	   or	   social	   (i.e.	  
disgusted)	   threat	   provoke	   similar	   or	   unique	   patterns	   of	   cortical	   activity.	   Specifically,	  we	   thought	   to	  
answer	   two	   questions.	   First,	   most	   commonly	   EEG	   research	   using	   facial	   expressions	   compares	  
responses	  between	  neutral	  and	  angry	  or	  fearful	  expressions	  (e.g.	  Eimer	  &	  Holmes,	  2007;	  Mühlberger	  
et	   al.,	   2009;	   Holmes,	   Vuilleumier,	   &	   Eimer,	   2003).	   These	   investigations	   do	   not	   allow	   answering	   the	  
question	  whether	  reactions	  to	  these	  faces	  reflect	  a	  perceived	  threat	  to	  physical	  or	  to	  social	   integrity.	  
However,	  the	  discrimination	  of	  effects	  of	  socially	  or	  physically	  threatening	  faces	  might	  be	  important	  in	  
the	  study	  of	  social	  anxiety.	  Human	  facial	  expressions	  serve	  as	  signal	  of	  social	  exclusion	  by	  connoting	  
approval	  or	  disapproval	   (Amir,	  Klumpp,	  Elias,	  Bedwell,	  Yanasak,	  &	  Miller,	  2005;	  Gilboa-­‐Schechtman,	  
Foa,	  &	  Amir,	  1999).	  They	  represent	  useful	  cues	   for	   the	  detection	  of	  social	   threats	  (Amir	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  
Schultz	   &	   Heimberg,	   2008;	   Heinrichs	   &	   Hofmann,	   2001).	   Contrary	   to	   the	   widespread	   utilization	   of	  
angry	   facial	   expressions,	   disgust	   has	   been	   mostly	   neglected	   (Rossignol,	   Anserlerne,	   Vermeulen,	  
Philippot,	   &	   Campanella,	   2007).	   Since	   the	   facial	   expression	   of	   disgust	   is	   usually	   perceived	   as	   self-­‐
directed	  and	  induces	  the	  fear	  of	  being	  publicly	  humiliated	  or	  rejected	  (Amir	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Phillips,	  Fahy,	  
David,	  &	  Senior,	  1998),	  it	  may	  represent	  a	  more	  disorder-­‐specific	  cue	  than	  angry	  face	  (Adolphs,	  2002;	  
Amir	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   Therefore,	  we	   aimed	   at	   differentiating	   cortical	   responses	   to	   disgusted	   and	   angry	  
faces.	  Moreover,	   emotional	   face	  processing	   in	   general	   can	  be	  divided	   into	   early	   and	   late	   stages	   (e.g.	  
Frenkel	  &	  Bar-­‐Haim,	  2011).	  Nevertheless,	  theories	  on	  face	  processing	  are	  inconclusive	  with	  regard	  to	  
the	   question	   whether	   expression	   is	   processed	   in	   a	   parallel	   or	   in	   a	   consecutive	   fashion	   with	   facial	  
identity	   (Bruce	   &	   Young,	   1986;	   Palermo	   &	   Rhodes,	   2007;	   Haxby,	   Hoffman,	   &	   Gobbini,	   2000).	   If	   an	  
evolutionary	   and	   disorder-­‐specific	   advantage	   lies	   in	   the	   early	   detection	   of	   threat	   cues,	   facial	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expression	  should	  be	  processed	  before	  identity,	  especially	  in	  anxious	  individuals.	  Thus,	  Study	  #3	  was	  
conducted	  to	  analyze	  whether	  the	  impact	  of	  displayed	  emotion	  on	  face	  processing	  occurs	  at	  early	  or	  
late	  stages	  of	  face	  processing.	  Behavioral	  and	  ERP	  data	  of	  Study	  #3	  support	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  very	  
early	  hypervigilance	  to	  emotional	  relative	  to	  neutral	  faces,	  with	  the	  strongest	  bias	  to	  disgusted	  faces.	  
At	  subsequent	  stages	  the	  differentiation	  between	  SAD	  and	  healthy	  subjects	  diminished	  and	  resulted	  in	  
higher	  activity	  in	  response	  to	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  threatening	  cues.	  	  	  
In	   conclusion,	   all	   studies	  provide	  evidence	   for	  a	  distinct	  pattern	  of	   threat	  processing	   in	  SAD.	  
Depending	  on	  stimulus	  characteristics	  this	  pattern	  reflects	  the	  fast	  hypervigilance	  to	  disorder-­‐specific	  
threatening	   cues.	   In	   emotional	   word	   processing	   this	   early	   hypervigilance	   seems	   to	   be	   followed	   by	  
avoidance	   of	   negative	   words	   in	   SAD.	   Together	   the	   results	   highlight	   the	   importance	   of	   considering	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3	   General	  discussion	  and	  outlook	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  first	  outline	  the	  main	  findings	  of	  this	  dissertation	  and	  then	  offer	  a	  broader	  
theoretical	   framework	   in	  which	   these	   findings	  may	  be	   incorporated.	   In	  doing	   so	   I	  will	   abstain	   from	  
repeating	  the	  main	  discussions	  of	  the	  three	  manuscripts.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  clinical	  implications	  
and	  directions	  for	  further	  research.	  
In	   addressing	   different	   types	   of	   threat	   processing,	   the	   present	   research	   sheds	   light	   on	   two	  
fundamental	  aspects	  of	  attention	  biases	  in	  SAD,	  i.e.	  the	  specificity	  and	  time	  course	  of	  threat	  processing.	  
The	  present	  dissertation	  rests	  in	  parts	  on	  the	  development	  and	  evaluation	  of	  a	  stimulus	  set	  that	  allows	  
us	  to	  differentiate	  between	  the	  impact	  of	  social	  and	  physical	  threat	  on	  word	  processing	  (Study	  #1).	  By	  
using	  this	  novel	  approach,	   the	  current	  work	  provides	   the	   first	  electroencephalographic	   confirmation	  
that	   social	   anxiety	   is	   associated	  with	   specific	   processing	   of	   threatening	  words.	  Considering	   a	   rather	  
symbolic	   representation	   of	   anxious	   schemata	   in	   SAD,	   the	   emotional	   content	   of	   a	   written	   word	  
appeared	   to	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   early	   and	   late	   stages	   of	   processing	   (Study	   #1	   and	   #2).	   Early	  
hypervigilance	   to	   emotional	   words	   was	   followed	   by	   more	   specific	   vigilance	   to	   negative	   words	   in	  
particular.	  Finally,	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  attention	  bias	  shifted,	  leading	  to	  cognitive	  avoidance	  of	  negative	  
words	   in	   SAD.	   More	   ecologically	   valid	   stimuli	   such	   as	   faces	   led	   to	   accelerated	   processing	   in	   SAD	  
compared	  to	  healthy	  controls	  (Study	  #3),	  which	  was	  followed	  by	  anxiety-­‐unspecific	  attention	  capture.	  
However,	  a	  specific	  effect	   to	  disorder-­‐relevant	  cues	  was	  only	  evident	   in	  response	   to	  emotional	   faces	  
but	   not	   words.	   By	   testing	   theoretical	   aspects	   of	   information	   processing	   theories	   via	   measures	   that	  
allow	  an	  high	  temporal	  resolution,	  different	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  present	  set	  of	  studies.	  	  
In	   general,	   this	   dissertation	   offers	   support	   for	   current	   cognitive	   theories	   on	   social	   anxiety.	  
More	  importantly,	   it	  adds	  to	  recent	  research	  showing	  that	  socially	  threatening	  faces	  and	  threatening	  
words	   in	   general	   direct	   attention	   in	   SAD.	   This	   adds	   to	   findings	   from	   behavioral	   paradigms	   and	   the	  
limited	  research	  on	  emotion	  ERP	  effects	  in	  SAD.	  The	  observed	  attention	  biases	  suggest	  strongly	  that	  a	  
pathological	  mechanism	  leading	  to	  early	  threat	  detection	   is	  triggered	  in	  SAD.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  
impact	  of	  emotion	  on	  word	  processing	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  occur	  before	  lexical	  processing	  (see	  Kissler	  et	  
al.,	  2006;	  Scott	  et	  al.,	  2009	  for	  discussions	  on	  this	  topic),	  social	  anxiety	  seems	  to	  precede	  the	  sequence	  
of	  stimulus	  processing,	  allowing	  for	  a	  faster	  detection	  of	  threat	  cues.	  As	  words	  tend	  to	  be	  evaluated	  as	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weaker	  emotional	  stimuli	   than	  pictures	  (Kindt	  &	  Brosschot,	  1997),	  emotion	  may	  not	  modulate	  word	  
processing	   so	   easily.	   However,	   in	   SAD	   it	   seems	   that	   even	   symbolic	   representation	   of	   individual	  
concerns	  or	  individual	  schemata	  are	  sufficient	  to	  activate	  an	  “anxiety	  program”	  (Schultz	  &	  Heimberg,	  
2008).	  This	  program	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  attention	  capture	  that	   is	   followed	  by	  avoidance	  (see	  Study	  #2).	  
Moreover,	   the	   functional	  aspect	  of	   this	  early	  emotion	   tagging	  becomes	  even	  more	  efficient	  when	  we	  
turn	  to	  more	  ecologically	  valid	  stimuli	  such	  as	  facial	  expressions	  (see	  Study	  #3).	  Relying	  on	  a	  passive	  
viewing	   task	   allowed	   us	   to	   analyze	   the	   pure	   assumptions	   derived	   from	   cognitive	   theories	   on	   social	  
anxiety.	   However,	   as	   the	   specificity	   of	   the	   attention	   biases	   observed	   in	   our	   study	   is	   far	   from	  
understood,	  questions	  about	   the	   interplay	  of	   schemata,	  anxiety	  networks	  and	  attention	  allocation	   in	  
SAD	  remain.	  	  
From	  a	  theoretical	  viewpoint,	   the	  present	  findings	  indicate	  that	  social	  anxiety	  may	  accelerate	  
the	   normal	   threat	   detection	   system	   found	   in	   healthy	   individuals.	   To	   date,	   there	   is	   a	   theoretical	  
agreement	   that	  attention	  biases	  occur	  on	  a	  preconscious	  or	  automatic	   level	   (for	  a	   review	  see	  Cisler,	  
Bacon,	   &	   Williams,	   2009).	   Most	   theories	   assume	   that	   these	   biases,	   as	   well	   as	   threat	   processing	   in	  
general,	   follow	   at	   least	   two	   consecutive	   steps.	   After	   an	   initial	   “quick	   and	   dirty”	   exploration	   of	   the	  
threat	  value	  of	  a	  stimulus	  that	   follows	  almost	  dichotomous	  rules	  (threat:	  yes/no),	  a	  somewhat	  more	  
elaborate	  analysis	  begins	  (Mogg	  &	  Bradley,	  1998;	  Mathews	  &	  Mackintosh,	  1998;	  Williams	  et	  al.,	  1988).	  
Theories	  do	  not	  agree	  on	  the	  precise	  number	  of	  stages	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  consciousness	  on	  each	  stage.	  
However,	  all	  models	  do	  converge	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  at	  least	  the	  initial	  registration	  of	  the	  threat	  value	  of	  a	  
given	   stimulus	   should	  be	   automatic	   and	  outside	  of	   conscious	   awareness	   (Cisler	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   In	   this	  
regard,	  our	  results	  add	   to	  a	  growing	  body	  of	   research	  showing	  a	  dissociation	  of	   the	   impact	  of	   social	  
anxiety	  on	  early	  and	  late	  stages	  of	  stimulus	  processing	  (e.g.	  Gamble	  &	  Rapee,	  2010;	  Staugaard,	  2010).	  
While	   the	   interference	  generated	  by	  social	  anxiety	   influences	  a	  broader	  spectrum	  of	   stimuli	  at	  early	  
stages,	   it	  seems	  to	  be	  less	  interfering	  at	   later	  stages	  or	  even	  work	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  probably	  
due	   to	   stimulus	   specific	   interference.	   If	   a	   stimulus	   is	   initially	   tagged	   as	   “possibly	   threatening”,	  
disorder-­‐specific	   cognition	   and	   schemata	   might	   guide	   its	   further	   elaboration.	   Moreover,	   recent	  
research	  has	  shown	  that	  if	  the	  experimental	  setup	  requires	  more	  elaborated	  tasks	  such	  as	  judgment	  or	  
interpretation,	   differences	   in	   attention	   biases	   between	   socially	   anxious	   and	  non-­‐anxious	   individuals	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would	  practically	  vanish	  (e.g.	  Staugaard,	  2010).	  Hence,	   it	  seems	  that	  in	  SAD	  biases	  are	  also	  apparent	  
when	  no	   task	   is	   at	  hand.	   In	   this	   case	   it	  might	  only	  be	   the	  activated	  anxiety	  program	  demanding	   the	  
quick	  detection	  of	  threats.	  It	  will	  be	  interesting	  to	  further	  elucidate	  whether	  this	  mechanism	  is	  due	  to	  
passive	  (stimulus-­‐driven)	  or	  active	  (goal-­‐directed)	  attention	  control	  (Öhman	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  	  
The	  present	   insights	   into	  the	  temporal	  dynamics	  of	  threat	  detection	  in	  SAD	  contribute	  to	  our	  
clinical	  understanding	  of	  social	  anxiety.	  Attention	  biases	  are	  now	  known	  to	  be	  important	  contributing	  
factors	   that	   most	   likely	   precede	   cognitive	   disturbances	   in	   SAD	   (e.g.	   misinterpretation,	   judgment,	  
negative	   self-­‐perception).	   This	   underlines	   the	   need	   for	   the	   development	   of	   specific	   treatments	   that	  
target	  attention	  biases.	  A	  first	  step	  towards	  such	  treatment	  has	  been	  made	  in	  recent	  years	  (Amir	  et	  al.,	  
2008,	   2009;	   Bögels	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Heeren,	   Peschard,	   &	   Philippot,	   2012b;	   Li,	   Tan,	   Qian,	   &	   Liu,	   2008).	  
According	   to	   this	   line	  of	   research,	   attention	  biases	   for	   threat	  have	  devastating	   consequences	   for	   the	  
individual.	  They	  predict	  the	  relapse	  in	  patients	  treated	  for	  generalized	  anxiety	  (Bradley,	  Mogg,	  Millar,	  
&	  White,	  1995)	  and	  SAD	  (Lundh	  &	  Öst,	  2001).	  Furthermore,	  they	  not	  only	  represent	  a	  risk	  factor	  for	  
the	   relapse	   of	   anxiety	   but	   also	   play	   a	   causal	   role	   in	   increasing	   state	   anxiety	   (MacLeod,	   Rutherford,	  
Campbell,	   Ebsworthy,	   &	  Holker,	   2002;	  Heeren	   et	   al.,	   2012b).	   At	   a	   clinical	   level,	   these	   biases	   can	   be	  
addressed	   through	   attention	   training,	   in	   order	   to	   minimize	   the	   cognitive	   vulnerability	   to	   stress	  
(Heeren	   et	   al.,	   2012b).	   Typically,	   these	   interventions	   comprise	   techniques	   aiming	   at	   improving	   the	  
ability	  to	  disengage	  attention	  from	  threat	  cues.	  However,	  whether	  this	  effect	  can	  be	  purely	  attributed	  
to	  an	   improvement	   in	   the	  ability	   to	  disengage	  attention	   from	  threat	   (disengagement	  hypothesis;	  e.g.	  
Amir	   et	   al.,	   2003;	   Fox	   et	   al.,	   2001)	   or	   to	   an	   improvement	   in	   the	   flexibility	   of	   attention	   allocation	  
(flexibility	   hypothesis;	   Wells,	   2002)	   requires	   further	   research.	   More	   importantly,	   as	   both	   cognitive	  
behavioral	  therapy	  (CBT)	  and	  attention	  training	  have	  proven	  effective	  (e.g.	  Heeren	  et	  al.,	  2012a;	  Gould,	  
Buckminster,	  Pollack,	  &	  Otto,	  1997),	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  one	  might	  be	  superior	  over	  the	  other	  
need	  to	  be	  understood.	  This	  question	  becomes	  even	  more	  important	  considering	  data	  indicating	  that	  
instructions	   to	  maintain	   the	   focus	   of	   attention	   on	   the	   feared	   situation	   increase	   the	   efficacy	   of	   CBT	  
(Wells	  &	  Papageorgiou,	  1998).	  	  
Of	   further	   significance,	   our	   findings	   of	   accelerated	   threat	   processing	   might	   indicate	   an	  
alteration	   of	   a	   basic	   fear	   processing	   mechanism	   in	   SAD.	   There	   is	   now	   ample	   evidence	   that	   threat	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processing	  in	  general	  is	  embedded	  in	  neural	  networks	  (fear	  structure)	  that	  enable	  a	  rapid	  detection	  of	  
threat	   (e.g.	   Foa	   &	   Kozak,	   1986;	   Lang,	   1979;	   Lang	   &	   Bradley,	   2009).	   These	   networks	   react	   to	  
environmental	  cues	  of	  danger	  with	  various	  behavioral,	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  responses	  to	  ensure	  the	  
survival	  of	  the	  individual.	  A	  normal,	  non-­‐pathological	  fear	  structure	  contains	  associations	  that	  reflect	  
an	  accurate	  image	  of	  the	  reality	  (e.g.	  approaching	  grizzly	  in	  the	  forest	  à	  grizzly	  bears	  are	  dangerous	  
à	   fear)	   leading	   to	   an	   accurate	   response	   initiation	   (à	   I	   should	   run	   away).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	  
pathological	  fear	  structure	  includes	  associations	  that	  do	  not	  reflect	  the	  reality	  leading	  to	  exacerbated	  
fear	   response.	  This	  maladaptive	   response	   is	  well	  known	   in	  posttraumatic	   stress	  disorder	   (PTSD).	   In	  
PTSD,	   activation	  of	   the	   fear	  network	  has	  been	   linked	   to	  an	  early	  attention	  bias	   towards	   threatening	  
cues	  (e.g.	  Adenauer	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  However,	  it	  has	  been	  stated	  that	  fear	  networks	  might	  also	  be	  evident	  
in	   other	   anxiety	  disorders,	   including	   SAD,	  with	   varying	  disorder-­‐specific	   association.	   In	   fact,	   several	  
authors	   reported	   distinct	   levels	   of	   specificity	   and	   coherence	   of	   fear	   structures	   in	   SAD	   among	   other	  
anxiety	  disorders	  (Cutchbert,	  Lang,	  Strauss,	  Drobes,	  Patrick,	  &	  Bradley,	  2003;	  Huppert	  &	  Foa,	  2004).	  It	  
seems	   that	  at	   least	   in	   some	  cases	   social	   anxiety	  might	  be	  viewed	  as	  activation	  of	   such	  an	  emotional	  
network	   structure	   in	  memory	   (Huppert	  &	   Foa,	   2004;	   Roelofs,	   Hagenaars,	  &	   Stins,	   2010).	   This	   view	  
extends	  current	  cognitive	  theories	  on	  social	  anxiety.	  Moreover,	  it	  suggests	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  network	  
that	   is	   created	   by	   aversive	   and	   potentially	   socially	   traumatizing	   childhood	   experiences	   (Huppert	   &	  
Foa,	  2004).	  In	  fact,	  an	  association	  between	  a	  history	  of	  childhood	  maltreatment	  and	  social	  phobia	  has	  
been	  documented	  (e.g.	  Gibb,	  Chelminski,	  &	  Zimmerman,	  2007;	  Simon	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  and	  might	  be	  even	  
stronger	   for	   emotional	   rather	   than	   physical	   or	   sexual	   types	   of	   maltreatment	   (e.g.	   Iffland,	   Sansen,	  
Catani,	   &	   Neuner,	   2012).	   Our	   findings	   of	   enhanced	   attention	   (EEG	   data,	   Study	   #2	   and	   #3)	   and	  
accelerated	  responses	  to	  threat	  cues	  in	  SAD	  (e.g.	  behavioral	  data,	  Study	  #2	  and	  #3)	  corroborates	  this	  
idea.	  Hence,	  early	  hypervigilance	  followed	  by	  avoidance	  in	  SAD	  might	  also	  be	  due	  to	  the	  activation	  of	  a	  
fear	  network	  leading	  to	  accelerated	  responses	  to	  threat	  cues.	  This	  has	  important	  clinical	  implications	  
as	  will	  be	  outlined	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  	  
As	  already	  stated,	  CBT	  has	  long	  been	  the	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  therapy	  for	  SAD.	  However,	  progress	  in	  
interventions	   focusing	   on	   attention	   biases	   and	   the	   idea	   of	   widespread	   fear	   networks	   in	   SAD	  might	  
suggest	  need	  for	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  current	  interventions.	  The	  mere	  presence	  of	  an	  anxiety	  network	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in	  patients	  calls	  for	  emotion	  processing	  that	  is	  traditionally	  embedded	  in	  exposure	  therapy	  (Huppert	  &	  
Foa,	   2004;	   Foa	   &	   Kozak,	   1986).	   The	   activation	   of	   the	   anxiety	   network	   accompanied	   with	   the	  
incorporation	   of	   information	   that	   is	   incompatible	   with	   the	   fear	   structure	   via	   exposure	   therapy	   has	  
proven	  effective	  in	  anxiety	  disorders	  (e.g.	  Hofmann	  &	  Smith,	  2008).	  In	  fact,	  similarly	  to	  CBT,	  exposure	  
therapy	  has	  also	  proven	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  treatment	  of	  SAD	  (Feske	  &	  Chambless,	  1995).	  Therefore,	  I	  
propose	  that	  specific	  treatments	  (CBT,	  attention	  training,	  exposure	  therapy)	  might	  be	  more	  suited	  for	  
certain	  subgroups	  of	  patients	  suffering	   from	  SAD.	  For	   instance,	   it	  would	  be	  plausible	   to	  assume	  that	  
social	   phobics	   who	   experienced	   extensive	   social	   traumata	   or	   bullying	   would	   show	   more	   specific	  
attention	  biases	   than	   those	  who	  did	  not.	   It	   is	  known	  that	  a	  subgroup	  of	  SAD	  report	   traumatic	  social	  
experiences	   (Erwin,	   Heimberg,	   Marx,	   &	   Franklin,	   2006;	   Öst	   &	   Hugdahl,	   1981;	   Stemberger,	   Turner,	  
Beidel,	   &	   Calhoun,	   1995).	   Therefore,	   I	   assume	   that	   these	   individuals	  might	   be	   particularly	   prone	   to	  
signals	  of	  social	  traumata	  due	  to	  an	  elaborated	  and	  sensitized	  fear	  network.	  In	  fact,	  some	  subjects	  with	  
SAD	  responded	  to	  stressful	  social	  memories	  with	  PTSD-­‐type	  symptoms	  (Erwin	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  They	  also	  
reported	  negative,	  spontaneous,	  recurrent	  images	  of	  socially	  stressful	  events	  that	  occurred	  around	  the	  
time	   of	   the	   onset	   of	   their	   anxiety	   (e.g.	  Hackmann,	   Clark,	  &	  McManus,	   2000).	   Thus,	   the	   likelihood	   of	  
accessing	  an	  emotion	  not	  only	  increases	  by	  presenting	  a	  disorder-­‐specific	  cue	  (e.g.	  Beck	  et	  al.,	  1985),	  
but	  also	  by	  presenting	  a	  cue	  that	  matches	  the	  propositions	  within	  a	  broader	  fear	  network	  (Lang,	  1987;	  
Lang,	  Bradley,	  &	  Cutchbert,	  1998).	  In	  turn,	  this	  would	  only	  be	  the	  case	  if	  such	  a	  network	  really	  exists.	  If	  
the	   crucial	  mechanism	   of	   social	   anxiety	   in	   this	   specific	   subgroup	   of	   patients	  was	   the	   presence	   and	  
activation	   of	   a	   fear	   structure,	   this	   would	   have	   important	   implications	   for	   the	   treatment	   of	   SAD.	  
Consequently,	   treatment	   should	   include	   a	  modification	   of	   the	   fear	   structure	   by	  means	   of	   emotional	  
processing	   via	   exposure	   therapy	   (see	   Huppert	   &	   Foa,	   2004	   for	   a	   discussion).	   Our	   findings	   are	  
consistent	  with	   the	   proposition	   of	   a	   fear	   network	   as	   they	   illustrate	   early	   attention	  biases	   to	   threat	  
cues.	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  specific	  effect	  of	  swear	  words	  might	  be	  due	  to	  the	  failure	  to	  disentangle	  patients	  
with	   and	   without	   an	   active	   fear	   network.	   However,	   as	   faces	   are	   more	   general	   and	   ecological	   valid	  
stimuli	   they	   might	   be	   more	   frequently	   embedded	   in	   fear	   structures,	   thus	   leading	   to	   more	   specific	  
attention	  effects	  as	  reported	  in	  the	  present	  dissertation.	  Within	  a	  socially	  traumatizing	  event	  it	  seems	  
comprehensible	  that	  the	  likelihood	  of	  being	  confronted	  with	  an	  angry	  or	  disgusted	  face	  is	  much	  higher	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than	   the	   likelihood	   of	   being	   called	   asshole,	   cunt	   or	  motherfucker.	   In	   summary	   then,	   considering	   the	  
existence	  of	  a	  fear	  network	  in	  some	  cases	  of	  SAD	  might	  help	  to	  understand	  the	  mixed	  pattern	  of	  results	  
found	  in	  the	  attention	  bias	  literature.	  	  
All	  in	  all,	  ample	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  vigilance	  to	  threat	  cues	  along	  with	  other	  cognitive	  and	  
behavioral	  factors	  comprise	  important	  building	  blocks	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  SAD.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  
specific	   role	   and	   interplay	   of	   these	   factors	   still	   requires	   further	   research.	  The	   absence	   of	   a	   specific	  
effect	   of	   socially	   threatening	  words	  may	   be	   due	   to	   experimental	   conditions.	   Perhaps	   the	   necessary	  
conditions	   for	   a	   specific	   effect	   to	  manifest	   requires	   a	   specific	   task	   that	   focuses	   on	   the	  processing	   of	  
emotion	   rather	   than	   passive	   viewing.	   Most	   importantly,	   our	   results	   add	   to	   the	   existing	   literature	  
suggesting	   that	   specific	   subgroups	   of	   individuals	   suffering	   from	   social	   anxiety	   are	   associated	   with	  
different	   cognitive,	   attention	   and	   memory	   disturbances.	   The	   development	   of	   specific	   treatments	  
targeting	  these	  subgroups	  demands	  further	  empirical	  support.	  
Future	  perspectives	  for	  research	  are	  derived	  when	  we	  consider	  a	  number	  of	  limitations	  of	  the	  
present	  research.	  Apart	  from	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  task	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  differentiate	  between	  attention	  
biases,	   different	   measures	   of	   attention	   and	   anxiety	   (electrophysiological,	   behavioral,	  
psychophysiological	  and	  self-­‐report)	  should	  be	  combined.	  To	  study	  the	  underlying	  mechanism	  a	  task	  
comprising	   two	   competing	   stimuli	   and	   the	   combination	   of	   behavioral	   and	   electrophysiological	  
measures	   is	   fairly	   essential,	   as	   biases	   are	   known	   to	   emerge	   when	   two	   stimuli	   are	   simultaneously	  
presented	   (Wieser,	   Pauli,	   Reicherts,	   &	   Mühlberger,	   2010;	   Gamble	   &	   Rapee,	   2010).	   Under	   these	  
conditions	   anxious	   participants	   seem	   to	   avoid	   threatening	   cues	   when	   there	   is	   an	   unthreatening	  
alternative	  (Chen	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Mansell	  et	  al.,	  1999).	  However,	   if	   the	  observed	  biases	  are	   truly	  due	   to	  
difficulties	  in	  disengagement	  from	  threat,	  the	  hampered	  disengagement	  still	  has	  to	  be	  preceded	  by	  the	  
detection	   of	   the	   threat	   cue.	   Without	   a	   competition	   for	   attention	   a	   final	   conclusion	   about	   the	  
mechanism	  underlying	  these	  biases	  cannot	  be	  drawn.	  As	  the	  functional	  aspects	  of	  ERPs	  are	  known	  to	  
be	   limited	   (Gordon,	   2000),	   a	   combination	   of	   measures	   might	   help	   to	   further	   understand	   attention	  
processes	  in	  social	  anxiety.	  	  
As	   social	   anxiety	   is	   associated	  with	   a	   strong	   self-­‐focused	   bias,	   future	   studies	  might	  want	   to	  
address	  the	  issue	  of	  self-­‐relevance	  in	  more	  detail.	  As	  it	  has	  been	  recognized	  that	  manipulation	  of	  the	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self-­‐relevance	   influences	   face	   and	   word	   processing	   (Herbert	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Schwarz,	   Wieser,	   Gerdes,	  
Mühlberger,	  &	  Pauli,	  2012)	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  observe,	  how	  the	  manipulation	  of	  self-­‐relevance	  
influences	  attention	  biases	  in	  SAD.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  disentangle	  the	  effect	  of	  different	  types	  and	  levels	  of	  anxiety	  future	  research	  should	  
try	   to	   include	   anxiety	   control	   groups	   showing	   either	   nonclinical	   social	   anxiety	   or	   other	   forms	   of	  
clinically	  significant	  anxiety.	  By	  doing	  so	  the	  specificity	  of	  attention	  biases	  and	  the	  impact	  on	  various	  
types	  and	   levels	  of	  anxiety	  can	  be	  distinguished,	   leading	   to	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  processes	   that	  
maintain	  anxiety.	  	  
Moreover,	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   fear	   network	   that	  modulates	   the	   allocation	   of	   attention	   in	   SAD	   has	  
important	   implications.	   Most	   prominent	  models	   of	   attention	   biases	   provide	   accounts	   of	   findings	   of	  
general	   negative	   biases	   in	   anxious	   individual.	   These	  models	   do	   not	   account	   for	   specific	   biases	   (e.g.	  
Huppert	  &	  Foa,	  2004).	  A	  fear	  structure	  with	  individual	  associations	  based	  in	  idiosyncratic	  experiences	  
may	  in	  turn	  account	  for	  specific	  attention	  biases.	  Moreover,	  if	  attention	  biases	  to	  threatening	  cues	  and	  
the	   resulting	   emotional	   response	   are	   indeed	   due	   to	   the	   activation	   of	   such	   fear	   networks,	   current	  
treatment	   approaches	   might	   be	   ineffective	   for	   these	   patients	   since	   the	   fear	   structure	   remains	  
unchanged.	   Thus,	   future	   research	  might	  want	   to	   aim	   at	   differentiating	   between	   those	   patients	  with	  
and	   without	   a	   disorder-­‐specific	   fear	   network.	   If	   fear	   networks	   modulate	   attention	   biases	   in	   some	  
patients	   with	   SAD,	   these	   patients	   need	   to	   be	   identified	   and	   given	   specific	   treatments.	   To	   optimize	  
current	   CBT	   approaches,	   the	   implementation	   of	   emotion	   processing	   techniques	   could	   be	   helpful	   in	  
addressing	  subgroups	  of	  SAD.	  While	  this	  line	  of	  research	  would	  naturally	  result	  in	  larger	  sample	  sizes,	  
it	  would	  also	  offer	  the	  opportunity	  to	  develop	  specialized	  treatments.	  	  	  
	   Finally,	   as	   attention	   biases	   seem	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   maintaining	   of	   social	   anxiety,	   more	  





4	   References	  
	   28	  
4	   References	  
Adenauer,	  H.,	  Pinösch,	  S.,	  Catani,	  C.,	  Gola,	  H.,	  Keil,	  J.,	  Kißler,	  J.,	  &	  Neuner,	  F.	  (2010).	  Early	  Processing	  of	  
Threat	  Cues	  in	  Posttraumatic	  Stress	  Disorder—Evidence	  for	  a	  Cortical	  Vigilance-­‐Avoidance	  
Reaction.	  Biological	  psychiatry,	  68(5),	  451-­‐458.	  	  
Adolphs,	  R.	  (2003).	  Cognitive	  neuroscience	  of	  human	  social	  behaviour.	  Nature	  Reviews	  Neuroscience,	  
4(3),	  165-­‐178.	  	  
American	  Psychiatric	  Association.	  (2000).	  Diagnostic	  and	  statistical	  manual	  of	  mental	  disorders	  (4th	  
ed.,	  text	  revision).	  Washington,	  DC:	  Author.	  
Amir,	  N.,	  Beard,	  C.,	  Taylor,	  C.	  T.,	  Klumpp,	  H.,	  Elias,	  J.,	  Burns,	  M.,	  &	  Chen,	  X.	  (2009).	  Attention	  training	  in	  
individuals	  with	  generalized	  social	  phobia:	  A	  randomized	  controlled	  trial.	  Journal	  of	  consulting	  
and	  clinical	  psychology,	  77(5),	  961.	  	  
Amir,	  N.,	  Elias,	  J.,	  Klumpp,	  H.,	  &	  Przeworski,	  A.	  (2003).	  Attentional	  bias	  to	  threat	  in	  social	  phobia:	  
Facilitated	  processing	  of	  threat	  or	  difficulty	  disengaging	  attention	  from	  threat?	  Behaviour	  
Research	  and	  Therapy,	  41(11),	  1325-­‐1335.	  	  
Amir,	  N.,	  &	  Foa,	  E.	  B.	  (2001).	  Cognitive	  biases	  in	  social	  phobia.	  In	  S.	  Hofmann	  &	  P.M.	  DiBartolo	  (Eds.),	  
From	  Social	  Anxiety	  to	  Social	  Phobia:	  Multiple	  Perspectives,	  268–280.	  Needham,	  MA:	  Allyn	  &	  
Bacon	  
Amir,	  N.,	  Foa,	  E.	  B.,	  &	  Coles,	  M.	  E.	  (1998).	  Automatic	  activation	  and	  strategic	  avoidance	  of	  threat-­‐
relevant	  information	  in	  social	  phobia.	  Journal	  of	  abnormal	  psychology,	  107(2),	  285.	  	  
Amir,	  N.,	  Klumpp,	  H.,	  Elias,	  J.,	  Bedwell,	  J.	  S.,	  Yanasak,	  N.,	  &	  Miller,	  L.	  S.	  (2005).	  Increased	  activation	  of	  
the	  anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  during	  processing	  of	  disgust	  faces	  in	  individuals	  with	  social	  
phobia.	  Biological	  psychiatry,	  57(9),	  975-­‐981.	  	  
Amir,	  N.,	  Weber,	  G.,	  Beard,	  C.,	  Bomyea,	  J.,	  &	  Taylor,	  C.	  T.	  (2008).	  The	  effect	  of	  a	  single-­‐session	  attention	  
modification	  program	  on	  response	  to	  a	  public-­‐speaking	  challenge	  in	  socially	  anxious	  
individuals.	  Journal	  of	  abnormal	  psychology,	  117(4),	  860.	  	  
Anderson,	  J.	  R.	  (2009).	  Cognitive	  psychology	  and	  its	  implications:	  Worth	  publishers.	  
Aron,	  A.	  R.,	  Robbins,	  T.	  W.,	  &	  Poldrack,	  R.	  A.	  (2004).	  Inhibition	  and	  the	  right	  inferior	  frontal	  cortex.	  
Trends	  in	  cognitive	  sciences,	  8(4),	  170-­‐177.	  
Asmundson,	  G.	  J.,	  &	  Stein,	  M.	  B.	  (1994).	  Selective	  processing	  of	  social	  threat	  in	  patients	  with	  
generalized	  social	  phobia:	  Evaluation	  using	  a	  dot-­‐probe	  paradigm.	  Journal	  of	  Anxiety	  Disorders,	  
8(2),	  107-­‐117.	  	  
Bar-­‐Haim,	  Y.,	  Lamy,	  D.,	  Pergamin,	  L.,	  Bakermans-­‐Kranenburg,	  M.	  J.,	  &	  van	  IJzendoorn,	  M.	  H.	  (2007).	  
Threat-­‐related	  attentional	  bias	  in	  anxious	  and	  nonanxious	  individuals:	  a	  meta-­‐analytic	  study.	  
Psychological	  bulletin,	  133(1),	  1-­‐24.	  	  
Baumeister,	  R.	  F.,	  &	  Leary,	  M.	  R.	  (1995).	  The	  need	  to	  belong:	  desire	  for	  interpersonal	  attachments	  as	  a	  
fundamental	  human	  motivation.	  Psychological	  bulletin,	  117(3),	  497-­‐529.	  	  
4	   References	  
	   29	  
Beck,	  A.	  T.	  (1976).	  Cognitive	  therapy	  and	  the	  emotional	  disorders.	  New	  York:	  International	  Universities	  
Press.	  
Beck,	  A.	  T.,	  Emery,	  G.,	  &	  Greenberg,	  R.	  L.	  (1985).	  Anxiety	  disorders	  and	  phobias:	  A	  cognitive	  perspective.	  
New	  York:	  Basic	  Books.	  
	  
Becker,	  E.	  S.,	  Rinck,	  M.,	  Margraf,	  J.,	  &	  Roth,	  W.	  T.	  (2001).	  The	  emotional	  Stroop	  effect	  in	  anxiety	  
disorders:	  General	  emotionality	  or	  disorder	  specificity?	  Journal	  of	  Anxiety	  Disorders,	  15(3),	  
147-­‐159.	  	  
Birbaumer,	  N.,	  Grodd,	  W.,	  Diedrich,	  O.,	  Klose,	  U.,	  Erb,	  M.,	  Lotze,	  M.,	  &	  Flor,	  H.	  (1998).	  fMRI	  reveals	  
amygdala	  activation	  to	  human	  faces	  in	  social	  phobics.	  NeuroReport,	  9(6),	  1223-­‐1226.	  	  
Bögels,	  S.	  M.	  (2006).	  Task	  concentration	  training	  versus	  applied	  relaxation,	  in	  combination	  with	  
cognitive	  therapy,	  for	  social	  phobia	  patients	  with	  fear	  of	  blushing,	  trembling,	  and	  sweating.	  
Behaviour	  Research	  and	  Therapy,	  44(8),	  1199-­‐1210.	  	  
Bögels,	  S.	  M.,	  &	  Mansell,	  W.	  (2004).	  Attention	  processes	  in	  the	  maintenance	  and	  treatment	  of	  social	  
phobia:	  hypervigilance,	  avoidance	  and	  self-­‐focused	  attention.	  Clinical	  psychology	  review,	  24(7),	  
827-­‐856.	  	  
Bradley,	  B.	  P.,	  Mogg,	  K.,	  Millar,	  N.,	  Bonham-­‐Carter,	  C.,	  Fergusson,	  E.,	  Jenkins,	  J.,	  &	  Parr,	  M.	  (1997).	  
Attentional	  biases	  for	  emotional	  faces.	  Cognition	  &	  Emotion,	  11(1),	  25-­‐42.	  	  
Bradley,	  B.	  P.,	  Mogg,	  K.,	  Millar,	  N.,	  &	  White,	  J.	  (1995).	  Selective	  processing	  of	  negative	  information:	  
Effects	  of	  clinical	  anxiety,	  concurrent	  depression,	  and	  awareness.	  Journal	  of	  abnormal	  
psychology,	  104(3),	  532.	  	  
Bradley,	  M.	  M.,	  &	  Lang,	  P.	  J.	  (1994).	  Measuring	  emotion:	  the	  self-­‐assessment	  manikin	  and	  the	  semantic	  
differential.	  Journal	  of	  behavior	  therapy	  and	  experimental	  psychiatry,	  25(1),	  49-­‐59.	  	  
Bradley,	  M.	  M.,	  &	  Lang,	  P.	  J.	  (1999).	  Affective	  norms	  for	  English	  words	  (ANEW):	  Instruction	  manual	  and	  
affective	  ratings:	  Technical	  Report	  C-­‐1,	  The	  Center	  for	  Research	  in	  Psychophysiology,	  
University	  of	  Florida.	  
Bruce,	  V.,	  &	  Young,	  A.	  (1986).	  Understanding	  face	  recognition.	  British	  journal	  of	  psychology,	  77(3),	  305-­‐
327.	  	  
Chen,	  Y.,	  Ehlers,	  A.,	  Clark,	  D.,	  &	  Mansell,	  W.	  (2002).	  Patients	  with	  generalized	  social	  phobia	  direct	  their	  
attention	  away	  from	  faces.	  Behaviour	  Research	  and	  Therapy,	  40(6),	  677-­‐687.	  	  
Cisler,	  J.	  M.,	  Bacon,	  A.	  K.,	  &	  Williams,	  N.	  L.	  (2009).	  Phenomenological	  characteristics	  of	  attentional	  
biases	  towards	  threat:	  A	  critical	  review.	  Cognitive	  therapy	  and	  research,	  33(2),	  221-­‐234.	  	  
Clark,	  D.	  M.,	  &	  Wells,	  A.	  (1995).	  A	  cognitive	  model	  of	  social	  phobia.	  In	  R.	  G.	  Heimberg,	  M.	  R.	  Liebowitz,	  
D.	  A.	  Hope,	  &	  F.	  R.	  Schneier,	  Social	  phobia:	  Diagnosis,	  assessment,	  and	  treatment	  (pp.	  69-­‐93).	  
New	  York:	  Guilford	  Press.	  	  
Coan,	  J.	  A.,	  &	  Allen,	  J.	  J.	  (2004).	  Frontal	  EEG	  asymmetry	  as	  a	  moderator	  and	  mediator	  of	  emotion.	  
Biological	  psychology,	  67(1),	  7-­‐50.	  
Corr,	  P.	  J.	  (2005).	  Social	  exclusion	  and	  the	  hierarchical	  defense	  system:	  Comment	  on	  MacDonald	  and	  
Leary	  (2005).	  Psychological	  bulletin,	  131(2),	  231-­‐236.	  	  
4	   References	  
	   30	  
Cuthbert,	  B.	  N.,	  Lang,	  P.	  J.,	  Strauss,	  C.,	  Drobes,	  D.,	  Patrick,	  C.	  J.,	  &	  Bradley,	  M.	  M.	  (2003).	  The	  
psychophysiology	  of	  anxiety	  disorder:	  Fear	  memory	  imagery.	  Psychophysiology,	  40(3),	  407-­‐
422.	  	  
Davidson,	  R.	  J.,	  Marshall,	  J.	  R.,	  Tomarken,	  A.	  J.,	  &	  Henriques,	  J.	  B.	  (2000).	  While	  a	  phobic	  waits:	  regional	  
brain	  electrical	  and	  autonomic	  activity	  in	  social	  phobics	  during	  anticipation	  of	  public	  speaking.	  
Biological	  psychiatry,	  47(2),	  85-­‐95.	  
Eimer,	  M.,	  &	  Driver,	  J.	  (2001).	  Crossmodal	  links	  in	  endogenous	  and	  exogenous	  spatial	  attention:	  
evidence	  from	  event-­‐related	  brain	  potential	  studies.	  Neuroscience	  &	  Biobehavioral	  Reviews,	  
25(6),	  497-­‐511.	  	  
Eimer,	  M.,	  &	  Holmes,	  A.	  (2002).	  An	  ERP	  study	  on	  the	  time	  course	  of	  emotional	  face	  processing.	  
NeuroReport,	  13(4),	  427-­‐431.	  	  
Eimer,	  M.,	  &	  Holmes,	  A.	  (2007).	  Event-­‐related	  brain	  potential	  correlates	  of	  emotional	  face	  processing.	  
Neuropsychologia,	  45(1),	  15-­‐31.	  	  
Erwin,	  B.	  A.,	  Heimberg,	  R.	  G.,	  Marx,	  B.	  P.,	  &	  Franklin,	  M.	  E.	  (2006).	  Traumatic	  and	  socially	  stressful	  life	  
events	  among	  persons	  with	  social	  anxiety	  disorder.	  Journal	  of	  Anxiety	  Disorders,	  20(7),	  896-­‐
914.	  	  
Evans,	  K.	  C.,	  Wright,	  C.	  I.,	  Wedig,	  M.	  M.,	  Gold,	  A.	  L.,	  Pollack,	  M.	  H.,	  &	  Rauch,	  S.	  L.	  (2008).	  A	  functional	  MRI	  
study	  of	  amygdala	  responses	  to	  angry	  schematic	  faces	  in	  social	  anxiety	  disorder.	  Depression	  
and	  anxiety,	  25(6),	  496-­‐505.	  	  
Feske,	  U.,	  &	  Chambless,	  D.	  L.	  (1995).	  Cognitive	  behavioral	  versus	  exposure	  only	  treatment	  for	  social	  
phobia:	  A	  meta-­‐analysis.	  Behavior	  Therapy,	  26(4),	  695-­‐720.	  	  
Foa,	  E.	  B.,	  &	  Kozak,	  M.	  J.	  (1986).	  Emotional	  processing	  of	  fear:	  Exposure	  to	  corrective	  information.	  
Psychological	  Bulletin,	  99,	  20–35.	  
Fox,	  E.,	  Russo,	  R.,	  Bowles,	  R.,	  &	  Dutton,	  K.	  (2001).	  Do	  threatening	  stimuli	  draw	  or	  hold	  visual	  attention	  
in	  subclinical	  anxiety?	  Journal	  of	  experimental	  psychology.	  General,	  130(4),	  681-­‐700.	  	  
Fox,	  E.,	  Russo,	  R.,	  &	  Dutton,	  K.	  (2002).	  Attentional	  bias	  for	  threat:	  Evidence	  for	  delayed	  disengagement	  
from	  emotional	  faces.	  Cognition	  &	  Emotion,	  16(3),	  355-­‐379.	  	  
Frenkel,	  T.	  I.,	  &	  Bar-­‐Haim,	  Y.	  (2011).	  Neural	  activation	  during	  the	  processing	  of	  ambiguous	  fearful	  
facial	  expressions:	  An	  ERP	  study	  in	  anxious	  and	  nonanxious	  individuals.	  Biological	  psychology,	  
88(2),	  188-­‐195.	  	  
Gamble,	  A.	  L.,	  &	  Rapee,	  R.	  M.	  (2010).	  The	  time-­‐course	  of	  attention	  to	  emotional	  faces	  in	  social	  phobia.	  
Journal	  of	  behavior	  therapy	  and	  experimental	  psychiatry,	  41(1),	  39-­‐44.	  
Gibb,	  B.	  E.,	  Chelminski,	  I.,	  &	  Zimmerman,	  M.	  (2007).	  Childhood	  emotional,	  physical,	  and	  sexual	  abuse,	  
and	  diagnoses	  of	  depressive	  and	  anxiety	  disorders	  in	  adult	  psychiatric	  outpatients.	  Depression	  
and	  anxiety,	  24(4),	  256-­‐263.	  	  
Gilboa-­‐Schechtman,	  E.,	  Foa,	  E.	  B.,	  &	  Amir,	  N.	  (1999).	  Attentional	  biases	  for	  facial	  expressions	  in	  social	  
phobia:	  The	  face-­‐in-­‐the-­‐crowd	  paradigm.	  Cognition	  &	  Emotion,	  13(3),	  305-­‐318.	  	  
Gordon,	  E.	  (2000).	  Integrative	  neuroscience:	  bringing	  together	  biological,	  psychological	  and	  clinical	  
models	  of	  the	  human	  brain:	  CRC	  PressI	  Llc.	  
4	   References	  
	   31	  
Gould,	  R.	  A.,	  Buckminster,	  S.,	  Pollack,	  M.	  H.,	  &	  Otto,	  M.	  W.	  (1997).	  Cognitive-­‐behavioral	  and	  
pharmacological	  treatment	  for	  social	  phobia:	  A	  meta-­‐analysis.	  Clinical	  Psychology:	  Science	  and	  
Practice,	  4(4),	  291-­‐306.	  	  
Grant,	  D.,	  &	  Beck,	  J.	  G.	  (2006).	  Attentional	  biases	  in	  social	  anxiety	  and	  dysphoria:	  Does	  comorbidity	  
make	  a	  difference?	  Journal	  of	  Anxiety	  Disorders,	  20(4),	  520-­‐529.	  	  
Hackmann,	  A.,	  Clark,	  D.	  M.,	  &	  McManus,	  F.	  (2000).	  Recurrent	  images	  and	  early	  memories	  in	  social	  
phobia.	  Behaviour	  Research	  and	  Therapy,	  38(6),	  601-­‐610.	  	  
Handy,	  T.	  C.,	  Green,	  V.,	  Klein,	  R.	  M.,	  &	  Mangun,	  G.	  R.	  (2001).	  Combined	  expectancies:	  Event-­‐related	  
potentials	  reveal	  the	  early	  benefits	  of	  spatial	  attention	  that	  are	  obscured	  by	  reaction	  time	  
measures.	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  Psychology:	  Human	  Perception	  and	  Performance,	  27(2),	  303-­‐
317.	  	  
Haxby,	  J.	  V.,	  Hoffman,	  E.	  A.,	  &	  Gobbini,	  M.	  I.	  (2000).	  The	  distributed	  human	  neural	  system	  for	  face	  
perception.	  Trends	  in	  cognitive	  sciences,	  4(6),	  223-­‐233.	  	  
Heeren,	  A.,	  Peschard,	  V.,	  &	  Philippot,	  P.	  (2012).	  The	  causal	  role	  of	  attentional	  bias	  for	  threat	  cues	  in	  
social	  anxiety:	  A	  test	  on	  a	  cyber-­‐ostracism	  task.	  Cognitive	  therapy	  and	  research,	  36(5),	  512-­‐521.	  	  
Heeren,	  A.,	  Reese,	  H.	  E.,	  McNally,	  R.	  J.,	  &	  Philippot,	  P.	  (2012).	  Attention	  training	  toward	  and	  away	  from	  
threat	  in	  social	  phobia:	  effects	  on	  subjective,	  behavioral,	  and	  physiological	  measures	  of	  anxiety.	  
Behaviour	  Research	  and	  Therapy,	  50(1),	  30-­‐39.	  	  
Heinrichs,	  N.,	  &	  Hofmann,	  S.	  G.	  (2001).	  Information	  processing	  in	  social	  phobia:	  A	  critical	  review.	  
Clinical	  psychology	  review,	  21(5),	  751-­‐770.	  	  
Heller,	  W.,	  Nitschke,	  J.	  B.,	  Etienne,	  M.	  A.,	  &	  Miller,	  G.	  A.	  (1997).	  Patterns	  of	  regional	  brain	  activity	  
differentiate	  types	  of	  anxiety.	  Journal	  of	  abnormal	  psychology,	  106(3),	  376-­‐385.	  	  
Herbert,	  C.,	  Junghofer,	  M.,	  &	  Kissler,	  J.	  (2008).	  Event	  related	  potentials	  to	  emotional	  adjectives	  during	  
reading.	  Psychophysiology,	  45(3),	  487-­‐498.	  	  
Herbert,	  C.,	  Pauli,	  P.,	  &	  Herbert,	  B.	  M.	  (2011).	  Self-­‐reference	  modulates	  the	  processing	  of	  emotional	  
stimuli	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  explicit	  self-­‐referential	  appraisal	  instructions.	  Social	  cognitive	  and	  
affective	  neuroscience,	  6(5),	  653-­‐661.	  	  
Herbert,	  C.	  (2007).	  Emotional	  words	  obtain	  priority	  in	  processing:	  Evidence	  from	  event-­‐related	  brain	  
potential	  and	  functional	  magnetic	  resonance	  imaging	  studies	  (Doctoral	  dissertation,	  
Dissertation,	  University	  of	  Konstanz,	  Konstanz).	  	  
Hirsch,	  C.	  R.,	  &	  Clark,	  D.	  M.	  (2004).	  Information-­‐processing	  bias	  in	  social	  phobia.	  Clinical	  psychology	  
review,	  24(7),	  799-­‐825.	  	  
Hofmann,	  S.	  G.,	  &	  Smits,	  J.	  A.	  (2008).	  Cognitive-­‐behavioral	  therapy	  for	  adult	  anxiety	  disorders:	  a	  meta-­‐
analysis	  of	  randomized	  placebo-­‐controlled	  trials.	  The	  Journal	  of	  clinical	  psychiatry,	  69(4),	  621-­‐
632.	  
Holmes,	  A.,	  Vuilleumier,	  P.,	  &	  Eimer,	  M.	  (2003).	  T	  he	  processing	  of	  emotional	  facial	  expression	  is	  gated	  
by	  spatial	  attention:	  evidence	  from	  event-­‐related	  brain	  potentials.	  Cognitive	  Brain	  Research,	  16,	  
174-­‐184.	  	  
4	   References	  
	   32	  
Hope,	  D.	  A.,	  Rapee,	  R.	  M.,	  Heimberg,	  R.	  G.,	  &	  Dombeck,	  M.	  J.	  (1990).	  Representations	  of	  the	  self	  in	  social	  
phobia:	  Vulnerability	  to	  social	  threat.	  Cognitive	  therapy	  and	  research,	  14(2),	  177-­‐189.	  	  
Hopfinger,	  J.	  B.,	  Luck,	  S.	  J.,	  &	  Hillyard,	  S.	  A.	  (2004).	  Selective	  attention:	  Electrophysiological	  and	  
neuromagnetic	  studies.	  In	  M.	  S.	  Gazzaniga	  (Ed.),	  The	  Cognitive	  Neurosciences	  (pp.	  561-­‐	  
574).	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press.Horley,	  K.,	  Williams,	  L.	  M.,	  Gonsalvez,	  C.,	  &	  Gordon,	  E.	  (2004).	  
Face	  to	  face:	  visual	  scanpath	  evidence	  for	  abnormal	  processing	  of	  facial	  expressions	  in	  social	  
phobia.	  Psychiatry	  research.	  	  
Huppert,	  J.	  D.,	  &	  Foa,	  E.	  B.	  (2004).	  Maintenance	  mechanisms	  in	  social	  anxiety:	  an	  integration	  of	  
cognitive	  biases	  and	  emotional	  processing	  theory.	  In	  J.	  Yiend	  (Ed),	  Cognition,	  Emotion	  and	  
Psychopathology:	  Theoretical,	  Empirical	  and	  Clinical	  Directions,	  213–281.	  Cambridge:	  
University	  Press.	  
Iffland,	  B.,	  Sansen,	  L.	  M.,	  Catani,	  C.,	  &	  Neuner,	  F.	  (2012).	  Emotional	  but	  not	  physical	  maltreatment	  is	  
independently	  related	  to	  psychopathology	  in	  subjects	  with	  various	  degrees	  of	  social	  anxiety:	  a	  
web-­‐based	  internet	  survey.	  BMC	  psychiatry,	  12(1),	  49.	  	  
Junghöfer,	  M.,	  Bradley,	  M.	  M.,	  Elbert,	  T.	  R.,	  &	  Lang,	  P.	  J.	  (2001).	  Fleeting	  images:	  A	  new	  look	  at	  early	  
emotion	  discrimination.	  Psychophysiology,	  38(2),	  175-­‐178.	  	  
Kessler,	  R.	  C.,	  Chiu,	  W.	  T.,	  Demler,	  O.,	  &	  Walters,	  E.	  E.	  (2005).	  Prevalence,	  severity,	  and	  comorbidity	  of	  
12-­‐month	  DSM-­‐IV	  disorders	  in	  the	  National	  Comorbidity	  Survey	  Replication.	  Archives	  of	  
general	  psychiatry,	  62(6),	  617-­‐627.	  	  
Kindt,	  M.,	  &	  Brosschot,	  J.	  F.	  (1997).	  Phobia-­‐related	  cognitive	  bias	  for	  pictorial	  and	  linguistic	  stimuli.	  
Journal	  of	  abnormal	  psychology,	  106(4),	  644-­‐648.	  	  
Kissler,	  J.,	  Assadollahi,	  R.,	  &	  Herbert,	  C.	  (2006).	  Emotional	  and	  semantic	  networks	  in	  visual	  word	  
processing:	  insights	  from	  ERP	  studies.	  Progress	  in	  brain	  research,	  156,	  147-­‐183.	  	  	  
Kolassa,	  I.	  T.,	  Kolassa,	  S.,	  Bergmann,	  S.,	  Lauche,	  R.,	  Dilger,	  S.,	  Miltner,	  W.	  H.,	  &	  Musial,	  F.	  (2009).	  
Interpretive	  bias	  in	  social	  phobia:	  An	  ERP	  study	  with	  morphed	  emotional	  schematic	  faces.	  
Cognition	  and	  Emotion,	  23(1),	  69-­‐95.	  	  
Kolassa,	  I.	  T.,	  Kolassa,	  S.,	  Musial,	  F.,	  &	  Miltner,	  W.	  H.	  (2007).	  Event-­‐related	  potentials	  to	  schematic	  faces	  
in	  social	  phobia.	  Cognition	  and	  Emotion,	  21(8),	  1721-­‐1744.	  	  
Kolassa,	  I.	  T.,	  &	  Miltner,	  W.	  H.	  (2006).	  Psychophysiological	  correlates	  of	  face	  processing	  in	  social	  
phobia.	  Brain	  research,	  1118(1),	  130-­‐141.	  	  
Koster,	  E.	  H.,	  Crombez,	  G.,	  Verschuere,	  B.,	  &	  De	  Houwer,	  J.	  (2004).	  Selective	  attention	  to	  threat	  in	  the	  
dot	  probe	  paradigm:	  Differentiating	  vigilance	  and	  difficulty	  to	  disengage.	  Behaviour	  Research	  
and	  Therapy,	  42(10),	  1183-­‐1192.	  	  
Lang,	  P.	  J.	  (1979).	  A	  bio-­‐informational	  theory	  of	  emotional	  imagery.	  Psychophysiology,	  16(6),	  495-­‐512.	  	  
Lang,	  P.	  J.,	  &	  Bradley,	  M.	  M.	  (2010).	  Emotion	  and	  the	  motivational	  brain.	  Biological	  psychology,	  84(3),	  
437-­‐450.	  	  
Lang,	  P.	  J.,	  Bradley,	  M.	  M.,	  &	  Cuthbert,	  B.	  N.	  (1998b).	  Emotion,	  motivation,	  and	  anxiety:	  brain	  
mechanisms	  and	  psychophysiology.	  Biological	  psychiatry,	  44	  (12),	  1248-­‐63.	  
4	   References	  
	   33	  
Leary,	  M.	  R.	  (1990).	  Responses	  to	  social	  exclusion:	  Social	  anxiety,	  jealousy,	  loneliness,	  depression,	  and	  
low	  self-­‐esteem.	  Journal	  of	  Social	  and	  Clinical	  Psychology,	  9,	  221–229.	  
Leary,	  M.	  R.,	  &	  Kowalski,	  R.	  M.	  (1995).	  The	  self-­‐presentation	  model	  of	  social	  phobia.	  Social	  phobia:	  
Diagnosis,	  assessment,	  and	  treatment,	  94-­‐112.	  	  
LeDoux,	  J.	  E.	  (2000).	  Emotion	  circuits	  in	  the	  brain.	  Annual	  review	  of	  neuroscience,	  23(1),	  155-­‐184.	  	  
Li,	  S.,	  Tan,	  J.,	  Qian,	  M.,	  &	  Liu,	  X.	  (2008).	  Continual	  training	  of	  attentional	  bias	  in	  social	  anxiety.	  Behaviour	  
Research	  and	  Therapy,	  46(8),	  905-­‐912.	  	  
Luck,	  S.	  J.,	  &	  Kappenman,	  E.	  S.	  (Eds.).	  (2012).	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Event-­‐Related	  Potential	  
Components.	  OUP	  USA.	  
Luck,	  S.	  J.,	  Woodman,	  G.	  F.,	  &	  Vogel,	  E.	  K.	  (2000).	  Event-­‐related	  potential	  studies	  of	  attention.	  Trends	  in	  
cognitive	  sciences,	  4(11),	  432-­‐440.	  	  
Lundh,	  L.-­‐G.,	  &	  Öst,	  L.-­‐G.	  (2001).	  Attentional	  bias,	  self-­‐consciousness	  and	  perfectionism	  in	  social	  phobia	  
before	  and	  after	  cognitive-­‐behaviour	  therapy.	  Scandinavian	  Journal	  of	  Behaviour	  Therapy,	  
30(1),	  4-­‐16.	  	  
MacDonald,	  G.,	  &	  Leary,	  M.	  R.	  (2005).	  Why	  does	  social	  exclusion	  hurt?	  The	  relationship	  between	  social	  
and	  physical	  pain.	  Psychological	  bulletin,	  131(2),	  202-­‐223.	  	  
MacDonald,	  G.,	  &	  Leary,	  M.	  R.	  (2011).	  Roles	  of	  social	  pain	  and	  defense	  mechanisms	  in	  response	  to	  
social	  exclusion:	  Reply	  to	  Panksepp	  (2005)	  and	  Coff	  (2005).	  Psychological	  bulletin,	  131(2),	  237-­‐
240.	  	  
MacLeod,	  C.,	  Mathews,	  A.,	  &	  Tata,	  P.	  (1986).	  Attentional	  bias	  in	  emotional	  disorders.	  Journal	  of	  
abnormal	  psychology,	  95(1),	  15-­‐20.	  	  
MacLeod,	  C.,	  Rutherford,	  E.,	  Campbell,	  L.,	  Ebsworthy,	  G.,	  &	  Holker,	  L.	  (2002).	  Selective	  attention	  and	  
emotional	  vulnerability:	  assessing	  the	  causal	  basis	  of	  their	  association	  through	  the	  
experimental	  manipulation	  of	  attentional	  bias.	  Journal	  of	  abnormal	  psychology,	  111(1),	  107-­‐
123.	  	  
Mansell,	  W.,	  Clark,	  D.	  M.,	  Ehlers,	  A.,	  &	  Chen,	  Y.-­‐P.	  (1999).	  Social	  anxiety	  and	  attention	  away	  from	  
emotional	  faces.	  Cognition	  &	  Emotion,	  13(6),	  673-­‐690.	  	  
Mathews,	  A.,	  &	  Mackintosh,	  B.	  (1998).	  A	  cognitive	  model	  of	  selective	  processing	  in	  anxiety.	  Cognitive	  
therapy	  and	  research,	  22(6),	  539-­‐560.	  	  
Mathews,	  A.,	  &	  MacLeod,	  C.	  (1985).	  Selective	  processing	  of	  threat	  cues	  in	  anxiety	  states.	  Behaviour	  
Research	  and	  Therapy,	  23(5),	  563-­‐569.	  	  
Mattia,	  J.	  I.,	  Heimberg,	  R.	  G.,	  &	  Hope,	  D.	  A.	  (1993).	  The	  revised	  Stroop	  color-­‐naming	  task	  in	  social	  
phobics.	  Behaviour	  Research	  and	  Therapy,	  31(3),	  305-­‐313.	  	  
Mogg,	  K.,	  &	  Bradley,	  B.	  P.	  (1998).	  A	  cognitive-­‐motivational	  analysis	  of	  anxiety.	  Behaviour	  Research	  and	  
Therapy,	  36(9),	  809-­‐848.	  	  
Mogg,	  K.,	  &	  Bradley,	  B.	  P.	  (1999).	  Some	  methodological	  issues	  in	  assessing	  attentional	  biases	  for	  
threatening	  faces	  in	  anxiety:	  A	  replication	  study	  using	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  probe	  
detection	  task.	  Behaviour	  Research	  and	  Therapy,	  37(6),	  595-­‐604.	  	  
4	   References	  
	   34	  
Mogg,	  K.,	  &	  Bradley,	  B.	  P.	  (2002).	  Selective	  orienting	  of	  attention	  to	  masked	  threat	  faces	  in	  social	  
anxiety.	  Behaviour	  Research	  and	  Therapy,	  40(12),	  1403-­‐1414.	  	  
Mogg,	  K.,	  &	  Bradley,	  B.	  P.	  (2005).	  Attentional	  bias	  in	  generalized	  anxiety	  disorder	  versus	  depressive	  
disorder.	  Cognitive	  therapy	  and	  research,	  29(1),	  29-­‐45.	  	  
Mogg,	  K.,	  Philippot,	  P.,	  &	  Bradley,	  B.	  P.	  (2004).	  Selective	  attention	  to	  angry	  faces	  in	  clinical	  social	  
phobia.	  Journal	  of	  abnormal	  psychology,	  113(1),	  160-­‐165.	  	  
Moser,	  J.	  S.,	  Huppert,	  J.	  D.,	  Duval,	  E.,	  &	  Simons,	  R.	  F.	  (2008).	  Face	  processing	  biases	  in	  social	  anxiety:	  an	  
electrophysiological	  study.	  Biological	  psychology,	  78(1),	  93-­‐103.	  	  
Mueller,	  E.,	  Hofmann,	  S.,	  Santesso,	  D.,	  Meuret,	  A.,	  Bitran,	  S.,	  &	  Pizzagalli,	  D.	  A.	  (2009).	  
Electrophysiological	  evidence	  of	  attentional	  biases	  in	  social	  anxiety	  disorder.	  Psychological	  
medicine,	  39(7),	  1141-­‐1152.	  	  
Mühlberger,	  A.,	  Wieser,	  M.	  J.,	  Herrmann,	  M.	  J.,	  Weyers,	  P.,	  Tröger,	  C.,	  &	  Pauli,	  P.	  (2009).	  Early	  cortical	  
processing	  of	  natural	  and	  artificial	  emotional	  faces	  differs	  between	  lower	  and	  higher	  socially	  
anxious	  persons.	  Journal	  of	  neural	  transmission,	  116(6),	  735-­‐746.	  	  
Musa,	  C.,	  Lépine,	  J.-­‐P.,	  Clark,	  D.,	  Mansell,	  W.,	  &	  Ehlers,	  A.	  (2003).	  Selective	  attention	  in	  social	  phobia	  and	  
the	  moderating	  effect	  of	  a	  concurrent	  depressive	  disorder.	  Behaviour	  Research	  and	  Therapy.	  
41,	  1043-­‐1054.	  
Öhman,	  A.,	  &	  Mineka,	  S.	  (2001).	  Fears,	  phobias,	  and	  preparedness:	  Toward	  an	  evolved	  module	  of	  fear	  
and	  fear	  learning.	  Psychological	  Review,	  108(3),	  483-­‐522.	  	  
Ollendick,	  T.	  H.,	  &	  Hirshfeld-­‐Becker,	  D.	  R.	  (2002).	  The	  developmental	  psychopathology	  of	  social	  anxiety	  
disorder.	  Biological	  psychiatry,	  51(1),	  44-­‐58.	  	  
Öst,	  L.-­‐G.,	  &	  Hugdahl,	  K.	  (1981).	  Acquisition	  of	  phobias	  and	  anxiety	  response	  patterns	  in	  clinical	  
patients.	  Behaviour	  Research	  and	  Therapy,	  19(5),	  439-­‐447.	  	  
Palermo,	  R.,	  &	  Rhodes,	  G.	  (2007).	  Are	  you	  always	  on	  my	  mind?	  A	  review	  of	  how	  face	  perception	  and	  
attention	  interact.	  Neuropsychologia,	  45(1),	  75-­‐92.	  	  
Phan,	  K.	  L.,	  Fitzgerald,	  D.	  A.,	  Nathan,	  P.	  J.,	  &	  Tancer,	  M.	  E.	  (2006).	  Association	  between	  amygdala	  
hyperactivity	  to	  harsh	  faces	  and	  severity	  of	  social	  anxiety	  in	  generalized	  social	  phobia.	  
Biological	  psychiatry,	  59(5),	  424-­‐429.	  	  
Phelps,	  E.	  A.,	  O'Connor,	  K.	  J.,	  Gatenby,	  J.	  C.,	  Gore,	  J.	  C.,	  Grillon,	  C.,	  &	  Davis,	  M.	  (2001).	  Activation	  of	  the	  
left	  amygdala	  to	  a	  cognitive	  representation	  of	  fear.	  Nature	  neuroscience,	  4(4),	  437-­‐441.	  	  
Phillips,	  M.,	  Fahy,	  T.,	  David,	  A.,	  &	  Senior,	  C.	  (1998).	  Disgust:	  The	  forgotten	  emotion	  of	  psychiatry.	  The	  
Britisch	  Journal	  of	  Psychiatry,	  172,	  373-­‐375.	  	  
Pineles,	  S.	  L.,	  &	  Mineka,	  S.	  (2005).	  Attentional	  biases	  to	  internal	  and	  external	  sources	  of	  potential	  
threat	  in	  social	  anxiety.	  Journal	  of	  abnormal	  psychology,	  114(2),	  314-­‐318.	  	  
Pishyar,	  R.,	  Harris,	  L.	  M.,	  &	  Menzies,	  R.	  G.	  (2004).	  Attentional	  bias	  for	  words	  and	  faces	  in	  social	  anxiety.	  
Anxiety,	  Stress	  &	  Coping,	  17(1),	  23-­‐36.	  	  
Posner,	  M.	  I.	  (1980).	  Orienting	  of	  attention.	  Quarterly	  journal	  of	  experimental	  psychology,	  32(1),	  3-­‐25.	  
4	   References	  
	   35	  
Rapee,	  R.	  M.,	  &	  Heimberg,	  R.	  G.	  (1997).	  A	  cognitive-­‐behavioral	  model	  of	  anxiety	  in	  social	  phobia.	  
Behaviour	  Research	  and	  Therapy,	  35(8),	  741-­‐756.	  	  
Rapee,	  R.	  M.,	  Sanderson,	  W.	  C.,	  McCauley,	  P.	  A.,	  &	  Di	  Nardo,	  P.	  A.	  (1992).	  Differences	  in	  reported	  
symptom	  profile	  between	  panic	  disorder	  and	  other	  DSM-­‐III-­‐R	  anxiety	  disorders.	  Behaviour	  
Research	  and	  Therapy,	  30(1),	  45-­‐52.	  	  
Rapee,	  R.	  M.,	  &	  Spence,	  S.	  H.	  (2004).	  The	  etiology	  of	  social	  phobia:	  Empirical	  evidence	  and	  an	  initial	  
model.	  Clinical	  psychology	  review,	  24(7),	  737-­‐767.	  	  
Roelofs,	  K.,	  Hagenaars,	  M.	  A.,	  &	  Stins,	  J.	  (2010).	  Facing	  Freeze	  Social	  Threat	  Induces	  Bodily	  Freeze	  in	  
Humans.	  Psychological	  Science,	  21(11),	  1575-­‐1581.	  	  
Rossignol,	  M.,	  Anselme,	  C.,	  Vermeulen,	  N.,	  Philippot,	  P.,	  &	  Campanella,	  S.	  (2007).	  Categorical	  perception	  
of	  anger	  and	  disgust	  facial	  expression	  is	  affected	  by	  non-­‐clinical	  social	  anxiety:	  an	  ERP	  study.	  
Brain	  research,	  1132(1),	  166-­‐176.	  	  
Schultz,	  L.	  T.,	  &	  Heimberg,	  R.	  G.	  (2008).	  Attentional	  focus	  in	  social	  anxiety	  disorder:	  Potential	  for	  
interactive	  processes.	  Clinical	  psychology	  review,	  28(7),	  1206.	  	  
Schupp,	  H.	  T.,	  Flaisch,	  T.,	  Stockburger,	  J.,	  &	  Junghofer,	  M.	  (2006).	  Emotion	  and	  attention:	  event-­‐related	  
brain	  potential	  studies.	  Progress	  in	  brain	  research,	  156,	  31-­‐41.	  	  
Schupp,	  H.	  T.,	  Ohman,	  A.,	  Junghofer,	  M.,	  Weike,	  A.	  I.,	  Stockburger,	  J.,	  &	  Hamm,	  A.	  O.	  (2004).	  The	  
facilitated	  processing	  of	  threatening	  faces:	  an	  ERP	  analysis.	  Emotion,	  4(2),	  189-­‐200.	  	  
Schwarz,	  K.	  A.,	  Wieser,	  M.	  J.,	  Gerdes,	  A.	  B.,	  Mühlberger,	  A.,	  &	  Pauli,	  P.	  (2012).	  Why	  are	  you	  looking	  like	  
that?	  How	  the	  context	  influences	  evaluation	  and	  processing	  of	  human	  faces.	  Social	  cognitive	  
and	  affective	  neuroscience.	  doi:10.1093/scan/nss013.	  
Scott,	  G.	  G.,	  O'Donnell,	  P.	  J.,	  Leuthold,	  H.,	  &	  Sereno,	  S.	  C.	  (2009).	  Early	  emotion	  word	  processing:	  
Evidence	  from	  event-­‐related	  potentials.	  Biological	  psychology,	  80(1),	  95-­‐104.	  	  
Sewell,	  C.,	  Palermo,	  R.,	  Atkinson,	  C.,	  &	  McArthur,	  G.	  (2008).	  Anxiety	  and	  the	  neural	  processing	  of	  threat	  
in	  faces.	  NeuroReport,	  19(13),	  1339-­‐1343.	  	  
Shackman,	  A.	  J.,	  McMenamin,	  B.	  W.,	  Maxwell,	  J.	  S.,	  Greischar,	  L.	  L.,	  &	  Davidson,	  R.	  J.	  (2009).	  Right	  
dorsolateral	  prefrontal	  cortical	  activity	  and	  behavioral	  inhibition.	  Psychological	  Science,	  
20(12),	  1500-­‐1506.	  
Simon,	  N.	  M.,	  Herlands,	  N.	  N.,	  Marks,	  E.	  H.,	  Mancini,	  C.,	  Letamendi,	  A.,	  Li,	  Z.,	  Pollack,	  M.	  H.,	  Van	  
Ameringen,	  M.,	  &	  Stein,	  M.	  B.	  (2009).	  Childhood	  maltreatment	  linked	  to	  greater	  symptom	  
severity	  and	  poorer	  quality	  of	  life	  and	  function	  in	  social	  anxiety	  disorder.	  Depression	  and	  
anxiety,	  26(11),	  1027-­‐1032.	  	  
Sposari,	  J.	  A.,	  &	  Rapee,	  R.	  M.	  (2007).	  Attentional	  bias	  toward	  facial	  stimuli	  under	  conditions	  of	  social	  
threat	  in	  socially	  phobic	  and	  nonclinical	  participants.	  Cognitive	  therapy	  and	  research,	  31(1),	  23-­‐
37.	  	  
Staugaard,	  S.	  R.	  (2010).	  Threatening	  faces	  and	  social	  anxiety:	  a	  literature	  review.	  Clinical	  psychology	  
review,	  30(6),	  669-­‐290.	  	  
Stein,	  D.,	  &	  Bouwer,	  C.	  (1997).	  Blushing	  and	  social	  phobia:	  a	  neuroethological	  speculation.	  Medical	  
hypotheses,	  49(1),	  101-­‐108.	  	  
4	   References	  
	   36	  
Stein,	  M.	  B.,	  Goldin,	  P.	  R.,	  Sareen,	  J.,	  Zorrilla,	  L.	  T.	  E.,	  &	  Brown,	  G.	  G.	  (2002).	  Increased	  amygdala	  
activation	  to	  angry	  and	  contemptuous	  faces	  in	  generalized	  social	  phobia.	  Archives	  of	  general	  
psychiatry,	  59(11),	  1027-­‐1034.	  
Stein,	  M.	  B.,	  &	  Stein,	  D.	  J.	  (2008).	  Social	  anxiety	  disorder.	  Lancet,	  371(9618),	  1115-­‐1125.	  	  
Stemberger,	  R.	  T.,	  Turner,	  S.	  M.,	  Beidel,	  D.	  C.,	  &	  Calhoun,	  K.	  S.	  (1995).	  Social	  phobia:	  an	  analysis	  of	  
possible	  developmental	  factors.	  Journal	  of	  abnormal	  psychology,	  104(3),	  526-­‐531.	  	  
Straube,	  T.,	  Mentzel,	  H.-­‐J.,	  &	  Miltner,	  W.	  H.	  (2005).	  Common	  and	  distinct	  brain	  activation	  to	  threat	  and	  
safety	  signals	  in	  social	  phobia.	  Neuropsychobiology,	  52(3),	  163-­‐168.	  	  
Stroop,	  J.	  R.	  (1935).	  Studies	  of	  interference	  in	  serial	  verbal	  reactions.	  George	  Peabody	  College	  for	  
Teachers.	  	  	  	  
Van	  Niekerk,	  J.	  K.,	  Moller,	  A.	  T.,	  &	  Nortje,	  C.	  (1999).	  Self-­‐schemas	  in	  social	  phobia	  and	  panic	  disorder.	  
Psychological	  reports,	  84(3),	  843-­‐854.	  	  
Veit,	  R.,	  Flor,	  H.,	  Erb,	  M.,	  Hermann,	  C.,	  Lotze,	  M.,	  Grodd,	  W.,	  &	  Birbaumer,	  N.	  (2002).	  Brain	  circuits	  
involved	  in	  emotional	  learning	  in	  antisocial	  behavior	  and	  social	  phobia	  in	  humans.	  
Neuroscience	  letters,	  328(3),	  233-­‐236.	  	  
Wells,	  A.	  (2002).	  Emotional	  disorders	  and	  metacognition:	  Innovative	  cognitive	  therapy:	  Wiley.	  
Wells,	  A.,	  &	  Papageorgiou,	  C.	  (1998).	  Social	  phobia:	  Effects	  of	  external	  attention	  on	  anxiety,	  negative	  
beliefs,	  and	  perspective	  taking.	  Behavior	  Therapy,	  29(3),	  357-­‐370.	  	  
Wieser,	  M.	  J.,	  McTeague,	  L.	  M.,	  &	  Keil,	  A.	  (2011).	  Sustained	  preferential	  processing	  of	  social	  threat	  cues:	  
bias	  without	  competition?	  Journal	  of	  cognitive	  neuroscience,	  23(8),	  1973-­‐1986.	  	  
Wieser,	  M.	  J.,	  Pauli,	  P.,	  Reicherts,	  P.,	  &	  Mühlberger,	  A.	  (2010).	  Don't	  look	  at	  me	  in	  anger!	  Enhanced	  
processing	  of	  angry	  faces	  in	  anticipation	  of	  public	  speaking.	  Psychophysiology,	  47(2),	  271-­‐280.	  	  
Williams,	  K.	  D.	  (2001).	  Ostracism:	  The	  power	  of	  silence.	  New	  York:	  Guilford	  Press.	  
Williams,	  J.,	  Watts,	  F.,	  MacLeod,	  C.,	  &	  Mathews,	  A.	  (1997).	  Cognitive	  psychology	  and	  emotional	  disorders	  
2nd	  ed.	  New	  York:	  Jolm	  Wiley	  &	  Sons.	  	  
Wilson,	  E.,	  &	  MacLeod,	  C.	  (2003).	  Contrasting	  two	  accounts	  of	  anxiety-­‐linked	  attentional	  bias:	  selective	  
attention	  to	  varying	  levels	  of	  stimulus	  threat	  intensity.	  Journal	  of	  abnormal	  psychology,	  112(2),	  
212-­‐218.	  	  
Yiend,	  J.	  (2010).	  The	  effects	  of	  emotion	  on	  attention:	  A	  review	  of	  attentional	  processing	  of	  emotional	  
information.	  Cognition	  and	  Emotion,	  24(1),	  3-­‐47.	  	  
Yiend,	  J.,	  &	  Mathews,	  A.	  (2001).	  Anxiety	  and	  attention	  to	  threatening	  pictures.	  The	  Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  
Experimental	  Psychology:	  Section	  A,	  54(3),	  665-­‐681.	  	  
	  
